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FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IN A
NETWORKED WORLD: FIRST AMENDMENT
REGULATION OF RELATIONAL
SURVEILLANCE
KATHERINE j. STRANDBURG *
Abstract: Recent controversies about the National Security Agency's war-
rantless wiretapping of international calls have overshadowed equally dis-
turbing allegations that the government has acquired access to a huge da-
tabase of domestic call traffic data, revealing information about times,
dates, and numbers called. Although communication content tradition-
ally has been the primary focus of concern about overreaching govern-
ment surveillance, law enforcement officials are increasingly interested in
using sophisticated computer analysis of noncontent traffic data to "map"
networks of associations. Despite the rising importance of digitally medi-
ated association, current Fourth Amendment and statutory schemes pro-
vide only weak checks on government. The potential to chill association
through overreaching relational surveillance is great. This Article argues
that the First Amendment's freedom of association guarantees can and
do provide a proper framework for regulating relational surveillance and
suggests how these guarantees might apply to particular forms of analysis
of traffic data.
INTRODUCTION
The National Security Agency (the "NSA") has reportedly ob-
tained a vast database of telephone records from some of the major
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telephone companies.' There are continuing efforts to require Inter-
net service providers ("ISPs") to maintain records of their customers'
travels over the Internet. 2
 The European Union has already adopted a
controversial Directive mandating telecommunications traffic data
retention. 3
 Popular attention has been focused intensely on "war-
rantless wiretapping" of the content of communications in light of con-
tinuing revelations about the Bush administration's post-September
11, 2001 surveillance programs and controversy over legislation in-
tended to regulate that surveillance and to immunize telecommunica-
tions from liability for their participation.' The surveillance efforts
that are the focus of this Article, however, make use of the endpoints
of communications, so-called "traffic data," rather than their con-
I See Leslie C.auley, NSA Has Afassive Database of Americans' Phone . Calls: 3 Telecoms Help
Government Collect Billions of Domestic Recants, USA TODAY, May 11, 2006, at Al; Barton
Gellman & Arshad Mohammed, Data on Phone Calls Monitored: Extent of Administration's
Domestic Surveillance Decried in Both Parties, W Asir. PosT, May 12, 2006, at Al. Recent reports
suggest that the NSA has cast an even broader net for traffic data than even that alleged in
the earlier reports concerning telephone call records. See Siobhan Gorman, NSA's Domestic
Spying Grows as Agency Sweeps Up Data, WALL ST, J., March 10, 2008, at Al.
2 See, e.g., Wendy R. Licbowitz, Call for Uniform Data Retention Standards for ISPs to Help in
Child Porn Investigations, 5 Privacy & Security L. Rep. (BNA) No. 27, at 935 ( July 3, 2006);
Peter P. Swire, Privacy and Information Sharing in the War on Terrorism, 51 Vim- L. REV. 951,
973 (2006); Virginia Panel Urges One Year ISP Data Retention, 6 Privacy & Security L. Rep.
(BNA) No. 1, at 26 ( Jan. 1, 2007) [hereinafter Virginia Panel Urges]; Saul Hansel] & Eric
Lichtblau, U.S. Wants Internet Companies to Keep Web-Surfing Records, N.Y. TIMES, June 2,
2006, at A15.
5
 European Parliament and Council Directive 2006/24, 2006 O.J. (L 105) 54, 57 (EC);
see also European Union Officials Formally Approve Data Retention Plan far Phone Calls, E-Mails, 5
Privacy & Security L. Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at 275 (Feb. 27, 2006) [hereinafter European Union
Officials). Countries do have some flexibility in how the Directive is implemented. See, e.g.,
Arthur Rogers, U.K Adapts Telecom Data Retention Law, Exempts Internet Communications, 6
Privacy & Security L. Rep. (BNA) No. 32, at 1247 (Aug. 6, 2007).
' See, e.g., Alexei Alexis. Feingold Declares War on Surveillance Bill Approved by Senate Intelli-
gence Committee, Privacy L. Watch (BNA) (Oct. 22, 2007) [hereinafter Alexis, Feingold De-
clares Mr]; Alexei Alexis, FISA Legislation Pulled from House Floor as Republicans Propose Set-
Back Measure, Privacy L. Watch (BNA) (Oct. 18, 2007) [hereinafter Alexis, FISA Legislation
Pulled]; Alexei Alexis, House Commerce Turns to Administration for Details on Alleged Telecom
Data-Sharing, Privacy L. Watch (BNA) (Oct. 16, 2007) [hereinafter Alexis, House Commerce
Turns to Administration]; Alexei Alexis, House Judiciary, Intel Panels Reject Legislation to Provide
Telecom Immunity, Privacy L. Watch (BNA) (Oct. 11, 2007) [hereinafter Alexis, House Judici-
ary, Intel Panels Reject Legislation); Alexei Alexis, Hoyer: Informal FISA Talks So Far Yield No
Deal on Telecom Immunity, Privacy L. Watch (BNA) (Feb. 27, 2008); Alexei Alexis, Surveil-
lance Program Broader than Previously Reported, McConnell Says, Privacy L. Watch (BNA) (Aug.
3, 2007); Eric Lichtblau, Court Weighs Making Public Rulings on U.S. Wiretapping, N.Y. Titers,
Aug. 18, 2007, at A10; Eric Lichtblau, Role of Telecom Firms in Wiretaps Is Confirmed, N.Y.
Timis, Aug. 24, 2007, at A13; Ralph Lindeman, Senate Panel Delays Action on FISA Bill:
Markup Could Be Pushed into December, Privacy L. Watch (BNA) (Nov. 9, 2007); James Risen,
Bush Signs Law to Widen Reach for Wiretapping, N.Y TIMES, Aug. 6, 2007, at Al.
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tents. 5 Attempts to use such noncontent information about commu-
nications to ferret out suspect groups and investigate their member-
ship and structure are increasingly in vogue, but have yet to receive
the attention from legal scholars and policy makers that they deserve.6
Traffic analysis is being updated to incorporate insights from "social
network analysis" —a means of analyzing relational structures origi-
nally developed by sociologists—and to take advantage of the avail-
5 See generally George Danezis, Introducing Traffic Analysis: Attacks, Defences and Public Pol-
icy Issues ... (Invited Talk), http://homes.esat.kuleuven.be/—gdanezis/TAIntro.pdf (last
visited Mar. 3, 2008) (providing an explanation of traffic analysis).
6 There are, on the other hand, numerous articles and studies discussing the Fourth
Amendment implications of data mining of transactional information and the Internet's
effect on surveillance of communications content. See generally KIRSTIE BALL ET AL., SUR-
VEILLANCE STUDIES NETWORK, A REPORT ON THE SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY (David Mum-
kami Wood ed., 2006); DAVID COLE & JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE CoNSTITU-
TION (3d ed. 2006); STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, THE ENEMY WITHIN (2002); DANIEL J.
SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON (2004); Patricia Beirut, Surveillance Law Through Cyberlaw's
Lens, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV, 1375 (2004); Michael D. Birnhack & Niva Elkin-Koren, The
Invisible Handshake: The Reemergence of the State in the Digital Environment, 8 VA. J.L. & TECH. 6
(2003); Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public and Private Law at
the Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241 (2007); Joseph S. Fulda, Data Mining
and Privacy, 11 ALB. L.J. ScL & TECH. 105 (2000); Stephen E. Henderson, Beyond the (Cur-
rent) Fourth Amendment: Protecting Third-Party Information, Third Parties, and the Rest of Us Too,
34 PEPP. L. Rev. 975 (2007); Stephen E. Henderson, Learning from All Fifty States: How to
Apply the Fourth Amendment and its State Analogs to Protect Third Party Information from Unrea-
sonable Search, 55 CA-r1. U. L. REv. 373 (2006) [hereinafter Henderson, Learning from All
Fifty States]; Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REv. 531
(2006); Orbs S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the
Case for Caution, 102 Mien. L. Kim 801 (2004) [hereinafter Kerr, Constitution-al Myths]; Seth
F. Kreimer, Watching the Watchers: Surveillance, Transparency, and Political Freedom in the War
on Terror, 7 U. PA. J. CoNs -r. L. 133 (2004); Paul Rosenzweig, Civil Liberty and the Response to
Terrorism, 42 Dog. L. REv. 663 (2004); Paul Rosenzweig, Privacy and Consequences: Legal and
Policy Structures for Implementing New Counter-Terrorism Technologies and Protecting Civil Liberty,
in EMERGENT INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES AND ENABLING POLICIES FOR COUNTER-
TERRORISM 421 (Robert L. Popp & John Yen eds., 2006) [hereinafter EMERGENT INFORMA-
TION TECHNOLOGIES]; Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amend-
ment, 75 U. CHI. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2008) [hereinafter Slobogin, Government Data Min-
ing], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1001972; Christopher Slobogin, Transaction
Surveillance by the Government, 75 Muss, L.J. 139 (2005) [hereinafter Slobogin, Transaction
Surveillance]; Daniel J. Steinbock, Data Matching, Data Mining, and Due Process, 40 GA. L.
REv. 1 (2005); Katherine J. Strand burg, Social Norms, Self Control, and Privacy in the Online
World, in PRIVACY AND ThCHNOLOGIRS OF IDENTITY: A CROSS-DISCIPLINARY CONVERSATION
31 (Katherine J. Strandburg & Daniela Stan Raicu eds., 2006); Peter P. Swire, Katz Is Dead.
Long Live Kau, 102 Micti, L. REv. 904 (2004) [hereinafter Swire, Katz Is Dead]; Swire, supra
note 2; K.A. Taipale, Whispering Wires and Warrantless Wiretaps: Data Mining and Foreign Intel-
ligence Surveillance, 7 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SECURITY, No. VII Supplemental Bull. on L. & Secu-
rity (2006), available at http://whisperingwires.info ; Joseph T. Thai, Is Data Mining Ever a
Search Under, justice Stevens's Fourth Amendment?, 74 FoRmiAm L. REV. 1731 (2006); Jonathan
Zittrain, Searches and Seizures in a Networked World, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 83 (2006), http://
www.harvardlawreview.orgiforum/issues/119/dec05/zittrainfor05.pdf.
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ability of computational techniques for mining vast databases of traffic
information.? Although "relational surveillance" making use of traffic
data has been around for many years, recent social and technological
developments have combined to raise the stakes. 8 Current legal doc-
trine, which centers on "privacy" and hence on protecting the content
of communications, does not adequately account for the extent to
which relational surveillance threatens to chill expressive association
in today's networked world. Courts have yet even to consider the First
Amendment implications of relational surveillance of this type. 9
7 See generally ALBERT-LAszt.,6 BARABASI, LINKED: THE NEW SCIENCE OF NETWORKS
(2002); T KOLDA El' AL., SANDIA NAT'L LABS, & LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NAT'L LAB., DATA
SCIENCES TECHNOLOGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND KNOWL-
EDGE DISCOVERY (2004); JEFFERY W. SEIFERT, CONGRF-SSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., DATA MIN-
ING: AN OVERVIEW, (2004), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31798.pdf;  DUNCAN J.
WATTS, SIX DEGREES: THE SCIENCE OF A CONNECTED AGE (2003); Kathleen M. Carley et al.,
Destabilizing Networks, 24 CorgtvEcTioNs 79 (2001), available at http://wwwinsna.org/Connec-
tions-Web/Volume24-3/Carley.web,pdf;  Peter 'Clerks, The Network Paradigm Applied to Criminal
Organisations: Theoretical Nitpicking or a Relevant Doctrine for Investigations? Recent Developments in
the Netherlands, 24 CONNECTIONS 53 (2001), available at http://www.insna.org/Connections-
Web/Volume24-3/Klerks.web.pdf; Robert L. Popp et al., Utilizing Information and Social Science
Technology to Understand and Counter the Twenty-First Century Strategic Threat, in EMERGENT IN-
FORMATION TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 6, at 1; Karl M. van Meter, Terrorists/Liberators: Research-
ing and Dealing with Adversary Social Networks, 24 CONNECTIONS 66 (2001), available at http://
wwwinsna.org/Connections-Web/Volume24-3/Karlsan.Meter.web.pdf; Stanley Wasserman
et al., Introduction to MODELS AND MEllIODS IN SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS I (Peter J. Car-
rington et al. eds., 2005); Patrick Radden Keefe, Can Network Theory Thwart Terrorists?, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 12, 2006, § 6 (Magazine), at 16; Nasrullah Menton & Henrik Legind Larsen,
Practical Approaches for Analysis, Visualization and Destabilizing Terrorist Networks (2006)
(on file with author); Danezis, supra note 5; George Danezis & Bettina Wittneben, The Eco-
nomics of Mass Surveillance and the Questionable Value of Anonymous Communications,
http://weis2006.econinfosec.org/docs/36,pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2008); Sofus A. Macskassy
& Foster Provost, Suspicion Scoring Based on Guilt-By-Association, Collective Inference, and
Focused Data Access (2005), hups://analysis.mitre.org/proceedings/Final_Papers_Files/
273_Camera_Ready_Paper.pdf. For a discussion of the relevance of network analysis to law
more generally, see Katherine J. Strandburg et al., Law and the Science of Networks: An Overview
and an Application to the "Patent Explosion, "21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1293, 1310-18 (2006).
8 See 'Clerks, supra nate 7, at 56-58; van Meter, supra note 7, at 67-70; Danezis, supra
note 5, § 2.
9 I argue in this Article that the First Amendment's protection of freedom of associa-
tion should play a key role in regulating relational surveillance. Two other scholars have
also argued in important recent articles that the First Amendment has a critical role to
play in regulating surveillance, but have emphasized the First Amendment's free speech
aspects. See generally Matthew Lynch, Closing the Orwellian Loophole: The Present Constitutional-
ity of Big Brother and the Potential for a First Amendment Cure, 5 FIRST AmENnst ENT L. REV. 234
(2007) (arguing, after rejecting other approaches as inadequate, that pervasive Orwellian
surveillance is unconstitutional under the First Amendment as a restriction on a speaker's
right to choose her audience and hence to choose not to speak to the government);
Daniell. Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.C. L. REV. 112 (2007). I
agree with their emphasis on the First Amendment implications of surveillance but focus
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Digital technology has transformed the ways in which civic and
political associations are formed and operate."' Nearly every organiza-
tion now uses email, websites, and cellular phones as primary means of
communications with members. Meanwhile, more and more political
and civic "work" in society is performed not by traditionally organized,
relatively long-lived, face-to-face associations with well-defined mem-
bers, leaders, policies, and goals, but by decentralized, often transient,
networks of individuals associating only or primarily electronically and
with policies and goals defined synergistically with the formation of the
emergent association itself. Relational surveillance has great potential
to chill this increasingly important emergent association, particularly
for those who are members of, or associate with members of, religious
and political minority groups. Fears of being swept up mistakenly in the
broad and vague applicability of statutes such as the criminal prohibi-
tion on "material support" of a designated terrorist organization or of
here more specifically on the issue of freedom of association in a networked society be-
cause I believe both that its importance is underappreciated and that freedom of associa-
tion doctrine is poised to play an important part in the debate because of its recent strong
endorsement by the Supreme Court in the case of Boy Scouts of America u Dale. See 530 U.S.
640, 655-56 (2000). Solove briefly discusses the freedom of association implications of
surveillance. See Solove, supra, at 147-49. Lynch sees "hope" in freedom of association doc-
trine as a means of regulating pervasive Orwellian surveillance but, in the end, prefers an
argument based on the right to choose one's audience. See Lynch, supra, at 260-64. My
focus here is different. I am concerned about the threat to association posed by sophisti-
cated analysis of traffic data, not by the equally important issue of government "listening
in on the content of speech.
I° For some of the numerous discussions of this topic, see generally YOCHAI BENITLER,
THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREE-
DOM (2006); HOWARD RHEINGOLD, SMART MOBS: THE NEXT SOCIAL REVOLUTION (2002);
DIANA SACO, CYBERING DEMOCRACY: PUBLIC SPACE AND THE INTERNET (2002); Julie
Cohen, Cyberspace as/and Space, 107 CoLum. L. Rev..210 (2007); Michael J. Madison, Social
Software. Groups, and Governance. 2006 MICH. ST, L. Rev. 153; Martha McCauhey & Michael
D. Ayers, Introduction to CYBERACTIVISM: ONLINE ACTIVISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 1
(Martha McCuilley & Michael D. Ayers eds., 2003) [hereinafter CvnettAcrivism]; Douglas
Schuler & Peter Day, Shaping the Network Society: Opportunities and Challenges, in SHAPING
THE NETWORK SOCIETY: THE NEW ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN CYBERSPACE 1 (Douglas
Schuler & Peter Day eds., 2004); Peter M. Shane, Introduction: The Prospects for Electronic
Democracy, in DEMOCRACY ONLINE: THE PROSPECTS FOR POLITICAL RENEWAL THROUGH THE
INTERNET, at xi (Peter M. Shane ed., 2004); Wim van de Donk et al., Introduction: Social
Movements and ICTs, in CYBERPROTE.ST: NEW MEDIA, CITIZENS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS I
Mint van de Donk et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter CvnexPRoTesa]; Anupam Chander.
Mdse Republic?, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1479 (2002) (reviewing CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM
(2001)); Beth Simone Noveck, A Democracy of Groups, FIRST MONDAY, No 7, 2005, http://
firstmonday.org/ issues/ issue10_11/noveck. .
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being placed on a "no-fly" list no doubt heighten the chilling effect
likely to flow from increasing use of relational surveillance."
Interest in employing social network analysis for law enforcement
purposes began with the study of criminal organizations," but was
given a huge boost after September 11, 2001, when attention focused
on tracking terrorist networks." The focus on preventing terrorism
rather than investigating past crimes, along with the tendency for ter-
rorist groups to be organized in decentralized networks of "cells" rather
than traditional hierarchies, has brought relational surveillance to the
center of the law enforcement agenda." At the same time, rising use of
the Internet, wireless communication, and locational technology means
that traffic data is increasingly recorded and stored by third party in-
termediaries. Computational capabilities have also increased dramati-
cally in the past few years, making it possible to apply computerized
analysis to larger datasets and heightening law enforcement and coun-
terterrorism interest in employing data mining techniques to uncover
"suspicious" patterns of association in traffic data,"
" See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2339A-2339B (West 2000 & Supp. 2007); see, e.g., David Cole, The
New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the Mr on Terrorism, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1, 1-2
(2003); Nina J. Crimm, High Alert: The Government's War on the Financing of Terrorism and Its
Implications for Donors, Domestic Charitable Organizations, and Global Philanthropy, 45 Wm. &
MARY L. RI:v. 1341, 1404-19 (2009); Linda E. Fisher, Guilt by Expressive Association: Political
Profiling, Surveillance and the Privacy of Groups, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 621, 625, 662 n.224 (2004);
Randolph N. Jonakait, The Melts Rea for the Crime of Providing Material Resources to a Foreign
Terrorist Organization, 56 BAvt.ort L. REV. 861, 869-72 (2004); Kreirner, supra note 6, at 165-
69; Tom Stacy, The "Material Support" Offense: The Use of Strict Liability in the War Against Ter-
ror, 14 KAN. J.L. & Pus. PolfY 461, 962-63 (2005); Kathryn A. Ruff, Note, Scared to Donate:
An Examination of the Effects of Designating Muslim Charities as Terrorist Organizations on the
First Amendment Rights of Muslim Donors, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEcts. & PUB. Pot.'Y 447, 471-75
(2005); Stephen Townley, Note, The Hydraulics of Fighting Terrorism, 29 HAMLINE L. REV. 65,
66-68 (2006); ACLU Faults Terrorism Screening System for Detention, Harassment of U.S. Travel-
ers, Privacy L. Watch (BNA) ( June 27, 2006); Joyce E. Cutler, Civil Rights Group Seeks Mich
List Details in FOIA Lawsuit Against Treasury Department, Privacy L. Watch (BNA) (May 23,
2007); Leslie Eaton, U.S. Prosecution of Muslim Group Ends in Mistrial, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23,
2007, at Al; Eric Lichtblau, F.B.I. Scrutinizes Antiwar Rallies, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2003, at
Al; Neil MacFarquhar, Abandon Stereotypes, Muslims in America Say, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2007,
at Al2.
12 See Klerks, supra note 7, at 54-56.
1'J
	 Taipale, supra note 6; van Meter, supra note 7, at 74; Gellman & Mohammed, supra
note 1; Keefe, supra note 7; Memon & Larsen, supra note 7, § 1; Danezis, supra note 5, § 3.
14 Sec Col.E. & DEMPSEY, supra note 6, at 19; KOLDA ET AL., Pipit/ note 7, at 1; SCHUL-
HOFER, supra note 6, at 1; Klerks, supra note 7, at 53-57; van Meter, supra. note 7, at 74-76;
Memon & Larsen, supra note 7, § 1.
15 See, e.g., Seth A. Greenblatt et al., Behavioral Network Analysis for Terrorist Detection, in
EMERGENT INFORMATION TECIINOLOGIES. supra note 6, at 331, 332-33; van Meter, supra
note 7, at 70-73; Keefe, supra note 7.
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Historically, both constitutional and statutory protections of com-
munications from government surveillance have been strongest for the
content of the communications, with significantly decreased protection
for traffic data, which reveals who is talking to whom. 16 Viewed through
the paradigm of secrecy and individual privacy that has dominated the
jurisprudence of surveillance under the Fourth Amendment, this slid-
ing scale of protection makes sense. Wiretapping a telephone seems
more intrusive than obtaining a list of the numbers an individual has
dialed, and the privacy invasion associated with government attention
to the content of a conversation seems correspondingly greater than
the harm of revealing the mere fact that the conversation occurred.
The growing potential for wide-reaching relational surveillance,
however, challenges the notion that the harm caused by unfettered
government surveillance is necessarily commensurate with the amount
of communication content revealed. Though considerable literature
has developed around the threat to privacy posed by aggregation and
categorization of personal information about specific individuals,r 7
there has as yet been little discussion of the particular implications of
relational surveillance as a distinctive type of government intrusion.
Computerized analysis of relationship networks is less widely publicized
and less fully developed than data mining techniques used to build
"digital dossiers" about individuals.° Traffic data, however, when stored,
aggregated, and analyzed using sophisticated computer algorithms, con-
tains far more "information" than is commonly appreciated.° It is time
for serious consideration of the appropriate means for Congress and the
courts to regulate relational surveillance.
Current law does not adequately contend with relational surveil-
lance, particularly in view of the increasing importance of emergent
association. Fourth Amendment doctrine and statutory privacy pro-
tections, with their focus on the content of communications, provide
very limited protection of traffic data and transactional records." The
potential chilling effect due to relational surveillance poses serious
risks not only to individual privacy, but to the First Amendment rights
to freedom of association and assembly. This is an important distinc-
16 See Slobogin, Transaction Surveillance, supra note 6, at 149,152.
17 See, e.g., SOLOVE, supra note 6, at 1-10; Slobogin, Transaction Surveillance, sum note
6, at 139-40 (citing sources).
18 See SOLOVE, supra note 6, at 1-26 (discussing data mining techniques used to build
"digital dossiers" abOut individuals).
19 See Danezis, supra note 5, § 1.
" See infra notes 121-207 and accompanying text.
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don because, although Fourth Amendment doctrine is grounded in a
perspective of "reasonable expectations" of privacy and hence has a
majoritarian bent, the First Amendment protects unpopular and even
"unreasonable" expression. 21
 The main contention of this Article is
that First Amendment freedom of association guarantees must pro-
vide an additional check, distinct from the Fourth Amendment's pro-
tections from unreasonable search and seizure, on overreaching rela-
tional surveillance potential. 22 Freedom of association case law,
however, as exemplified by the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
2000, in Bay Scouts of America v. Dale, has so far been concerned with
the rights of existing, formal associations and has not yet adapted to
the networked world. 23
 The doctrine must be adapted to apply to the
forms of association that define today's important political and cul-
tural milieu. As this Article argues in detail below, the First Amend-
ment's freedom of association guarantees require that any program of
relational surveillance meet a strict scrutiny standard. 24 The surveil-
lance must serve a legitimate and compelling government interest
and its methodology must be sufficiently accurate and narrowly tai-
21 See United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 816-17 (2000); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353, 357-58 (1967) (establishing reasonable expectation of
privacy test for Fourth Amendment). This distinction has some relevance to the ongoing
debate as to whether the courts or the legislative branch are best suited to regulate gov-
ernment surveillance. See, e.g., Kerr, Constitutional Myths, supra note 6. at 858 (arguing that
Congress is best suited to regulate surveillance using new technologies); Swire, Katz is
Dead, supra note 6, at 905 (arguing that courts have an important role to play in regulating
surveillance using new technologies). Courts may be uniquely sensitive to the important
protection of minority expressive association even if legislatures are more attuned to mean
"reasonable expectations of privacy."
" See infra notes 276-353 and accompanying text.
23 See 530 U.S. at 648, 655-56. In Guilt by Expressive Association: Political Profiling, Surveil-
lance and Me Privacy of Groups, Linda E. Fisher considers the impact of surveillance on the
freedom of association of political and religious groups and argues that the expansive pro-
tection of groups' expressive freedom should limit political surveillance, but her article
focuses on real space surveillance. Fisher, supra note 11, at 643-45. In Watching the Iiiitchers:
Surveillance, Transparency, and Political Freedom in the War on Terror, Seth F. Kreimer argues
that freedom of association is threatened by loose interpretations of criminal prohibitions
on "material support" to terrorists. Kreimer, supra note 6, at 165. For the most part, how-
ever, scholarly consideration of freedom of association has debated the role of traditional
civic associations in today's world but has yet to grapple extensively with new forms of asso-
ciation facilitated by cyberspace or with the relationship between free association and sur-
veillance. Sec generally CIVII. SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT (Nancy L. Rosenblum & Robert C.
Post eds., 2002); NANCY L. ROSENBLUM, MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS: THE PERSONAL USES
DI PLURALISM IN AMERICA (1998); Daniel A. Farber, Speaking in the Firs: Person Plural: Ex-
pressive Associations and the First Amendment, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1483 (2001); David Bernstein,
Expressive Association After Dale, Soc. PH IL. & PoL'v., July 2004, at 195.
24 Ste infra notes 208-275 and accompanying text.
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bored to that interest in light of the extent to which it is likely to ex-
pose protected expressive. and intimate associations. Although it will
be quite possible to meet this standard in many instances involving
law enforcement and counterterrorism, the standard must be en-
forced. Because current law imposes only the most minimal restric-
tions on government access to and analysis of traffic data, current
standards are far from meeting this constitutional requirement. 25
Part I of this Article explores the increasing importance for social
and political life of "emergent associations" that make use of modern
digital communication technology. 26 Part H discusses the increasing
availability of traffic data. 27 It then introduces the concept of social
network analysis, explaining (and speculating to some extent about)
the ways in which traffic data might be used for surveillance and dis-
cussing some of the pitfalls of such uses. 28 Part III discusses the relevant
legal frameworks for protecting emergent associational life, focusing on
the Fourth Amendment/statutory surveillance law paradigm and on
First Amendment protection of freedom of association. 29 Although
concluding that the First Amendment right to freedom of association
provides the strongest basis for regulating relational surveillance, it ex-
tracts suggestive principles from Fourth Amendment doctrine about
how surveillance regulation must respond to technological change.
These principles can be employed to extend the First Amendment
analysis into the new age of electronic communications. Part IV sets out
a framework for analyzing relational surveillance programs and makes
an initial attempt to apply this freedom of association framework to
some specific types of relational surveillance."
I. RELATIONAL SURVEILLANCE AND NETWORKS OF ASSOCIATION
New communication technologies are opening up exciting new
possibilities for civil and political association. The Internet, embodied
in the World Wide Web, email, listserves, chat rooms, weblogs, and in-
stant messaging, has revolutionized the organization of grassroots po-
litical movements.31 The speed and asynchronous nature of Internet
25 See infra notes 171-207 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 37-58 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 59-116 and accompanying text.
29 See infn2 notes 117-275 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 276-379 and accompanying text.
31
 See, e.g., Arthur Edwards, The Dutch Women 's Movement Online: Internet and the Organiza-
tional Infrastructure of a Social Movement in CYBERPROTEST, supra note 10, at 183, 191-200
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communication makes it an ideal tool for rapidly mobilizing a group of
like-minded citizens. The Internet also facilitates broad-based recruit-
ing through web pages and listserves and, perhaps even more impor-
tantly, harnesses the high connectivity and information advantages of
social networks because of the ease of email forwarding and hyperlink-
ing. These features allow political and civic associations to organize and
adapt quickly without necessarily using a central command and control
strategy." Newer technologies, combining Internet communication
with locational information, promise even more."
Today's emergent associations differ in important ways from tradi-
tional political and social organizations because digital communication
technology has lowered the costs of collective activity and decreased the
importance of geographical proximity. Associations can emerge on all
size scales and can be geographically local or dispersed. They can form
around very specific issues and then die out quickly. They may remain
loosely connected and dispersed or eventually coalesce into more tradi-
tional forms of organization with paid staff, hierarchical organization,
centralized decision making, and so forth. Strategies, issues, and posi-
tions can either be selected using a specified democratic process or im-
posed by a central leadership; or an association may self-organize out of
the independent actions of individuals. Expressive associations can
quickly "piggyback" on existing social networks or organizational affilia-
tions. A bicycle club, for example, may be instantly transformed by its
listserve into an advocacy group when local ordinances related to bicy-
cle traffic or funding for bike lanes are up for consideration. Such a
group need not adopt an official stance on an issue in order to produce
a compelling presence at a city council meeting or a flood of emails to
an elected official. The low cost (both financial and otherwise) of start-
ing and participating in collective behavior using modern communica-
tion technology facilitates experimentation by individuals and by
(examining uses of the Internet by several grassroots organizations in the Dutch women's
movement); Joanne Lebert, Wiring Human Rights Activism: Amnesty International and the Chair
len= of Information and.Communication Technologies, in CYBERACTIVISM , supra note 10, at 209,
210-23 (examining Amnesty International's use of information and communication tech-
nologies, including email and the Internet, for information production/dissemination and
grassroots communication, coordination, and mobilization efforts).
32 See RIIEING01.1), supra note 10, at 157-58 (providing examples of the use of "smart
mob" behavior and "swarming" tactics for group mobilization through various methods of
Internet communication, including email, text messaging, and webcasts of digital video);
Timothy Zick, Clouds, Cameras, and Computers: The First Amendment and Networked Public Places,
59 FLA. L. REV. 1,18-19 (2007); Noveck, supra note 10.
55 See, e.g., RH EING011), supra note 10, at xi—xxii; Zick, supra note 32, at 18-21.
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groups. It allows groups to reconfigure quickly to address social issues
as they arise, The network structure permits established groups to join
together quickly and easily for particular actions, while remaining sepa-
rate for others, and many-to-many communication facilitates coopera-
tion between different groups.
These features of emergent association are exciting and promis-
ing for a number of reasons. Although money is never absent as a fea-
ture of political life, inexpensive Internet communication opens the
door to a more effective exercise of political power by groups without
significant material resources. It also permits the faster and more ef-
fective aggregation of financial resources from many individuals to
serve as an alternative to more traditional fundraising, which must
focus on the well-heeled. The anonymity (or, more accurately, pseu-
donymity) of Internet communication also facilitates the emergence
of groups that might never otherwise have formed because potential
members might have been deterred from participating until the in-
volvement of a threshold number of others was assured.
The characteristics of modern communications technology that
enhance association, however, also enhance the potential that associa-
tion will be chilled by relational surveillance. Although the threads of
Internet organization and other digital communication are invisible
in the physical world, they can be all too easily traced in cyberspace.
This will be all the more true if ISPs are required to retain logs of
Internet transactions. Not only can surveillance of emergent associa-
tions be more complete because of their cyberspace "tracks" but, as
discussed in Part II, network analysis has at least the potential to ex-
pose these associations to government or public scrutiny at a much
earlier stage of organization than would be possible for a traditional,
"real space" organization. 34 Long before there is a name for the asso-
ciation, a platform of positions, slate of officers, or membership list
(indeed an emergent association may sometimes accomplish its pur-
pose without ever having any of those things), the associational pat-
tern is recorded in the traffic data. Associations may be evident from
communication patterns even before the participants themselves are
aware that they have formed a collective enterprise and certainly be-
fore participants have made the kind of intentional "joining" decision
that is typical for traditional organizations.
For these emergent associations, and even for traditional associa-
tions that make extensive use of digital communications, the potential
34 See infra notes 37-116 and accompanying text.
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chilling effects of relational surveillance are profound. Not only
might the tracing of patterns of communications be essentially equiva-
lent to exposing (and thereby chilling) knowing membership in an
unpopular group, but the mining of association from communication
patterns also exposes exploratory activities, such as inquiries, partici-
pation in email campaigns, or subscribing to an informational
listserve, which could mark an individual as a "member" of an associa-
tion before any "joining" decision has been made. Moreover, as dis-
cussed below, computational techniques for analyzing social networks
are far from perfect and can categorize an individual as a member of
a group simply because he or she has some other connection to some
of its members. 35 Because the complete network of relations is not
apparent to participants, the only way to ensure that one is not mis-
takenly associated with an unpopular group is to confine one's com-
munications to those well within the mainstream. Relational surveil-
lance, even more than government investigation of membership in
traditional associations, has the potential to chill not only knowing
association with unpopular groups, but even the exploration of non-
mainstream ideas in a social context. Comprehensive relational sur-
veillance (or even the appearance or threat of comprehensive rela-
tional surveillance) has the unfortunate propensity to nip in the bud
the very types of informal and flexible associations that modern tech-
nology has just begun to produce.
Of course, like all advances in communication technology, the
Internet and related digital communication technologies are useful
not only to legitimate political and civic groups but also to criminal
and terrorist groups. These organizations can also benefit from the
pseudonymity and loose structure of emergent association. Indeed,
fear that digital communication technology may enhance the effec-
tiveness of malevolent associations drives government and law en-
forcement efforts in relational surveillance. The difficult policy ques-
tion is how to regulate relational surveillance so that it can be used by
the authorities when and if appropriate, but not abused or used at too
great a cost to liberty. Unfortunately, as will be discussed in Part III,
the current legal regime, both statutory and constitutional, has yet
even to acknowledge, let alone to account for, the importance of
emergent association and the danger of relational surveillance. 36
" See infra notes 59-116 and accompanying text.
36 See infra notes 117-275 and accompanying text.
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II. THE RISE IN RELATIONAL SURVEILLANCE
In May 2006, newspaper headlines were full of reports that the
NSA had been secretly amassing a huge database of phone call records
obtained from many of the country's leading telephone companies."
Subsequent news reports have suggested that the government's use of
the call records database produced intense controversy among De-
partment of Justice lawyers in 2004. 38
 This revelation, following on the
heels of earlier revelations of NSA warrantless wiretapping of interna-
tional phone calls, produced widespread concern about government
overreaching. The Bush administration eventually agreed to submit its
warrantless wiretapping program to review by the specialized court set
up by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA"), but com-
plained that the resulting rulings, which have not been made public,
were too restrictive." Congress eventually bowed to White House pres-
sure, passing highly controversial legislation, which expanded govern-
ment wiretapping authority in some circumstances for a six month pe-
riod, after which the issue was to be reconsidered by Congress. 4° That
legislation was allowed to expire and debate continues as to the even-
tual scope of foreign intelligence wiretapping powers. 41
Though news reports commonly lump the two NSA programs to-
gether, they appear to be distinct: the government contends that the
57 See, e.g., Cauley, supra note 1; Gellman & Mohammed, supra note 1; see also Gorman,
supra notel (providing further reports concerning government use of even more extensive
databases of transactional data).
" Scott Shane & David Johnston, Mining of Data Prompted Fight over U.S. Spying, N.Y
TIMES, July 29, 2007, at Al.
59 Eric Lichtblau et at, Reported Drop in Surveillance Spurred a Law, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11,
2007, at Al; Eric Lichtblau & David Johnston, Court to Oversee U.S. Wiretapping in Terror
Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2007, at Al. That court issued orders, which have not been made
public, regulating the program. Lichtblau & Johnston, supra. at Al. The American Civil
Liberties Union filed a lawsuit seeking disclosure of the orders, which was denied. Dan
Eggen, Secret Court Asks for White House View on Inquiry: ACLU Seeking Rulings Issued on War-
rantless Wiretapping, WASH. Pon', Aug. 18, 2007, at A3; Elizabeth Williamson, Secret U.S.
Intelligence Court Intends to Keep Wiretap Rulings Under Wraps, WAsti. Pos.r, Dec. 12, 2007, at
A27.
40 See Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552 (2007) (codified
as amended as amended at 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-1805c (West 2003 & Supp. II 2007));
Lichtblau et al., supra note 39; James Risen, Bush Signs Law to Widen Reach for Wiretapping,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2007, at Al; James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Concerns Raised on Wider
Spying Under New Law, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2007, at Al.
41 See Alexei Alexis, Bush lows to Veto House 'Compromise" on FISA as Democrats Allow Secret
Session, Privacy L. Watch (BNA) (Mar. 14, 2008) [hereinafter Alexis, Bush Vows]; Alexei
Alexis, House Commerce Democrats Renew Call for Mrrantless Wiretapping Details, Privacy L.
Watch (BNA) (Mar. 10, 2008).
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warrantless wiretapping is aimed at scanning the content of interna-
tional calls to and from "potential terrorists," but the reported aim of
the database of phone call records (which, as far as one can tell, in-
cludes millions of purely domestic calls) is to facilitate "network analy-
sis" presumably for purposes of relational surveillance. 42 The NSA's
programs are the subject of the Electronic Frontier Foundation's law-
suit against AT&T." The suit alleges that AT&T broke the law when it
provided the government access both to call content and to its phone
call records database.44 The lawsuit is currently before the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit." The government is seeking to have the
suit dismissed on national security grounds." Congress is also consider-
ing controversial provisions in the new surveillance legislation that
would immunize the telecommunications companies from liability for
their complicity in the NSA programs, with the House and Senate hav-
ing passed competing bills. 47
A. The Availability of Traffic Data
The publicity surrounding the NSA allegations and lawsuits dra-
matically highlights the extent to which telephone traffic data is rou-
tinely recorded and stored by commercial carriers, in part for billing
purposes." ISPs are another repository of large caches of traffic data.
ISP logs contain traffic data about email senders and recipients, instant
message participation, participation in chat rooms, and also records of
Internet "surfing," which can be used to track the online behavior of
particular individuals." Although ISPs generally do not bill on a per-
transaction basis and need not save their logs of Internet traffic for very
42 See, e.g., Cautey, supra note 1; Keefe, supra note 7.
43 See Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 978-80 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
44 Id.
45 See Hepting v. AT&T Corp., Nos. 06-17132, 06-17137 (9th Cir. argued Aug. 15, 2007).
46 Reply Brief for the United States at 2, Hepting, Nos. 06-17132, 06-17137 (9th Cir. May
2007). For updated information about the status of the lawsuit, see Electronic Frontier
Foundation, www.eff.org (last visited Mar. 4, 2008),
47 See Alexis, Bush VOws, supra note 41; Bob Egelko, Feinstein Baths Legal Immunity for
Telecom Firms in Wiretap Cases, S.F. OtRON„ Nov. 9, 2007, at Bl; Eric Lichtblau, House Votes to
Reject Immunity for Phone Companies Involved in Wiretaps, TIMES, Mar. 15, 2008, at Al3;
Eric Lichtblau, In Wiretap Law's Stead, Uncertainty, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2008, at A17; Eric
Lichtblau, In Senate, a White House Victory on Eavesdropping, N.Y. TwEs, Jan. 25, 2008, at
A19; Jonathan Weisman & Ellen Nakashima, Senate and Bush Agree on Terms of Spying Bill,
WASH. l'os's, Oct. 18, 2007, at Al. Compare S. 2248, 110th Cong. (2007), with H.R. 3773,
110th Cong. (2008).
46 See supra notes 37-47 and accompanying text.
40 See SOLOVE, supra note 6, at 167-68.
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long, many do save detailed logs of Internet traffic for purposes rang-
ing from troubleshooting to marketing. 5° Some ISPs claim that they
intentionally destroy those logs to protect the anonymity and confiden-
tiality of their customers. 51 Indeed, recent controversy over Google's
use of search query records have led Microsoft and Ask.com to an-
nounce, presumably in an attempt to attract privacy-conscious users,
that they will take steps to curtail the amount of personal log informa-
tion they maintain. 52 Law enforcement officials, however, would like to
ensure the expanded availability of Internet traffic logs for many rea-
sons.53 Partly in response to concerns about child pornography; the
European Union recently passed a Data Retention Directive requiring
ISPs to maintain logs for law enforcement purposes for a certain period
of time. 54 Similar proposals to require retention of traffic data have
been floated in the U.S. Congress, though none has yet been passed. 55
Telephone call records and ISP logs are only the tip of the iceberg
of traffic data that could be made available to the government. Finan-
cial records, for example, are also a source of relational information.
There have been complaints internationally that certain companies that
handle large numbers of financial transactions have made their records
available to the U.S. government in contravention of local privacy
laws.56 As more phone calls are made from wireless phones (and ernails
more often are sent between mobile, wireless devices) it becomes in-
creasingly possible to maintain records not only of calling numbers, call
recipients, and call times, but also of the geographical locations of call-
5° Alexei Alexis, FTC to Examine Consumer Tracking Practices Used by Online Ad Industry,
Privacy L. Watch (DNA) (Aug. 7, 2007); Saul Hansell, Advertisers Trace Paths Users Leave on
Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2006, at Cl.
51 Miguel He1ft, Ask.com Puts a Bet on Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2007, at Cl.
52 Id.; see also Alexei Alexis, Competition Could Help Reform Online Ad Industry, Report Says,
Privacy L. Watch (BNA) (Aug. 9, 2007).
53 See SOLOVE, supra note 6, at 166.
54 See European Parliament and Council Directive 2006/24, 2006 O.J. (L 105) 54, 57
(EC); European Union Officials, supra note 3, at 275; Rogers, supra note 3, at 1247.
" See Liebowitz, supra note 2, at 935; Virginia Panel Urges, supra note 2, at 26; Haase &
Lichtblau, supra note 2.
" See, e.g.,Joe Kirwin, EU Data Privacy Officials Say U.S.-STITFT Deal Breaches Law, Seek Halt
to U.S. Data Access, 5 Privacy & Security L. Rep. (BNA) No. 47, at 1657 (Dec. 4, 2006). This
particular controversy is being resolved by changes to the agreement about data exchanges.
Rick Mitchell, SWIFT joins U.S. Safe Harbor; Alloroing EU Data Transfers for US. Anti-Terror Probes,
6 Privacy & Security L. Rep. (BNA) No. 31, at 1210 (July 30. 2007); Rick Mitchell, SWIFT
Plans Changes to Assuage Concerns over Privacy, Expects Safe Harbor Approval, 6 Privacy & Security
L. Rep. (BNA) No. 29, at 1124 ( July 16, 2007).
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ers and recipients. 57 Location may be inferred from the locations of the
call towers which carried the calls or obtained from precise geographi-
cal tracking data associated with GPS technology employed to facilitate
emergency response or, more trivially, to provide locationally cued ser-
vices such as restaurant reviews or "yellow pages" services.58
The exploding availability of traffic data on communications is not
the result of any Big Brother program of surveillance. It is a natural by-
product of modern communication technologies, social practices that
rely increasingly on conummication carried by commercial intermedi-
aries, and the fact that technology for data storage has improved to the
point that it is extremely cheap to keep records and to store them—
indeed probably cheaper simply to keep everything than to figure out
what to keep and what to destroy. These trends can only be expected to
continue. Unless they are precluded from doing so by law or public
pressure, commercial intermediaries will sell—or simply provide—
communication traffic data to the government. The era when most
communications and associations were shielded by practical obscurity
and faded into history is over. Citizens and policymakers must grapple
with the question of how a nearly comprehensive record of the network
of private communications should be regulated and used.
B. Evolving Uses of Traffic Data and Social Network Analysis
The use of traffic data for law enforcement and by the military has
a long history.59 For example, in World War I, military officials analyzed
the earth returns of telegraph communications near transmitting sta-
tions to obtain traffic information about telegraph communications.°
When the military began to rely on wireless communications, these
communications were tracked and intercepted. 61 Even when the con-
tent of the communications was unavailable because, for example, it
was encrypted, the traffic data was analyzed. 62 The analysis of commu-
nications networks also has a relatively long history. 63 In 1941, for ex-
ample, such data was used by the British to reconstruct the network
57 Sec RIIE INGOLD, supra note 10, at 97-100; van Meter, supra note 7, at 71-72; Danezis,
supra note 5, § 4.
5B See RIIEINGOLD, supra note 10, at 97-100.
59 See Danezis, supra note 5, § 2.
6° Id.
61 Id.
62 See id.
es Set id.
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structure of the German Air Force, thus allowing a more accurate esti-
mate of German military strength. 64
These historical precursors, however, differ from today's uses of
traffic data in both kind and degree. Historically, the use of traffic data
was limited both by the need to intercept traffic data in real time (and
hence to know in advance what data to intercept) and by the difficulty
in analyzing such data using "pen and paper" techniques. 65 The extent
to which traffic data is automatically recorded today means that there is
no technological need to identify the subjects of relational surveillance
in advance. Because nearly all communications are conducted through
intermediaries whose records can in principle be obtained retrospec-
tively, relational surveillance is not constrained by practical limitations
on the number of communications that can be tracked. Advanced
Computational capability combines with the availability of such com-
plete records to change the nature of relational surveillance pro-
foundly. Not only is it possible to map out the immediate associates of a
target individual, but the network of associations may be extended to
the associates of those immediate associates and so forth.
Social network analysis provides a variety of metrics for compar-
ing different social networks and for analyzing the positions of par-
ticular individuals in the network." For example, an individual's role
in the network can be measured in terms of "degree" (the number of
associations the individual has) or "betweenness" (the extent to which
relationships between other members of the network go "through" a
particular individual). 67 The network itself can be characterized,
among other things, by its degree of reciprocity (the extent to which
relationships "go both ways" —I call you and you call me—as opposed
to being unidirectional—I give you orders) and transitivity (the extent
to which one individual's associates are associated with each other). 68
Social network analysis was developed as a research tool for under-
standing human relationships and organizations. 69 It is also being de-
veloped as a tool to diagnose communications bottlenecks and other
Danezis, supra note 5, § 2.
65 See Greenblatt et:al., supra note 15, at 333.
For a discussion of social network metrics, see, e.g., BAHAnAst, supra note 7, at 25-
40; WATTS, supra note 7, at 39-40; Martin G. Everett & Stephen P. Borgatti, Extending Cen-
trality, in MODELS AND MVIIIODS IN SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS, supra note 7, at 57, 58-68;
Strandburg et al., supra note 7, at 1301-02.
67 Strandburg et al., supra note 7, at 1302,1305.
68
 Id. at 1301,1306-07.
69 See WATrs, supra note 7, at 13.
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problems in existing business organizations and, alternatively, to iden-
tify key players in known terrorist or criminal networks. 7°
There are several ways in which one might consider employing
social network metrics in a law enforcement or antiterrorism context.
For example, associational patterns within a known network might be
used to identify those playing key roles in hopes of deploying strategies
to destabilize or undermine the networks. 71
 Because this kind of analy-
sis focuses on known individuals, it is not very likely to chill expressive
activity unless it is abused to study groups identified by their political or
other legitimate activities. This Article focuses on two other applica-
tions of network analysis—targeted "link analysis" and "pattern analy-
sis" —that are employed to identify associations that are not already
known. 72 Targeted "link analysis" focused on a particular individual
would be used to determine the associative groups to which that indi-
vidual belongs. 73 Much more ambitiously, network "models" of malevo-
lent associations might be developed and data mining techniques used
for "pattern analysis" in the hope of identifying terrorist or other
criminal or socially troublesome networks. 74
All of these approaches are in their infancy and pose potential
civil liberties issues, but targeted link analysis and pattern analysis are
both less well-developed and far more troubling than the use of social
network metrics to analyze known networks. For one thing, the prop-
erties of social networks are such that most individuals in the United
States are connected by a surprisingly small number of associative
links (the so-called "small world" property). 75 Targeted link analysis
and pattern analysis, which rely on analyzing networks of communica-
tions patterns, thus have the potential to sweep in a very large num-
ber of individuals and their associations in short order. Pattern analy-
sis, especially in its most ambitious guises, would require access to very
large databases of mostly innocent traffic data. It would subject the
persons associated with that data (nearly everyone in the case of the
allegedly government-acquired AT&T database, for example) to the
" See, e.g., Carley et al., supra note 7, at 82; Rob Cross et al., Six Myths About Informal Net-
works—And How to Overcome Them, in CREATING VALUE WITH KNOWLEDGE: INSIGIFIS FROM
THE 111N1 INSITFUTE FOR BUSINESS VALUE 47,57-58 (Eric L. Lesser & Laurence Prusack eds.,
2004); Greenblatt et al., supra note 15, at 343-47; Klerks, supm note 7, at 54-58.
71 Klerks, supra note 7, at 58-63.
" See K.A. Taipale, Data Mining and Domestic Security: Connecting the Dots to Make Sense of
Data, 5 Cot.uNt. Sc'. & Thcil. L. Rsv. 2,34 (2003).
73 Id.
74 See id.
" See BARABASI, supra note 7, at 41-54; WArrs, supra note 7, at 37-42.
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risk of adverse government action as a result of mistake or more in-
sidious abuse by government actors. 76
Roughly, applications of social network analysis to relational sur-
veillance can be placed into the below hierarchy of increasing intru-
siveness and decreasing accuracy.
1. Analysis of Known Social Networks
One application of social network analysis is to analyze the struc-
ture of relationships between a group of individuals already suspected
of criminal or terrorist activity so as to identify key individuals and roles
played by various other individuals. 77 Though it employs more sophisti-
cated algorithms, such analysis of relationships between already identi-
fied individuals is simply a twenty-first century version of tried and true
investigative techniques such as mapping out links between people on a
chalkboard. Of course, even this kind of analysis is somewhat intrusive,
as is any surveillance of a group's activities. Moreover, though there is a
relatively robust literature of studies of existing well-defined networks
upon which such an analysis can be based, that research suggests that it
is often not possible to identify those playing key roles using relational
data alone. 78 Although network analysis of groups of known individuals
might even reduce intrusive surveillance by focusing wiretapping and
other intrusive real-time surveillance on key individuals, relying on re-
lational data could also result in a mistaken focus on minor players in a
malevolent association (and in underestimating the role of important
players). •
Whatever the accuracy and eventual usefulness of social network
analysis as applied to groups of known individuals, it seems unlikely to
have much of a chilling effect on legitimate association as long as the
group to be studied is identified in a legitimate fashion. Social network
analysis can be applied to any group. Though there is little to worry
about if law enforcement officials use it to identify the roles played by
individuals known to belong to a criminal gang or terrorist organiza-
tion, like any surveillance technique the technology for analyzing
known networks can be abused. Social network analysis could be used
by government officials in a "rogue" fashion for personal or political
76 See Hepting, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 978.
" See KOLDA ET AE., supra note 7, at 15; SEIFERT, supra note 7, at 3; Klerks, supra note 7,
at 58-63; Keefe, supra note 7; Memon & Larsen, supra note 7. § 2; Macskassy & Provost,
supra note 7, § 1.
78 See SEIFERT, supra note 7, at 3.
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purposes such as identifying key targets for harassment. Such misuse of
government surveillance apparatus is certainly not far-fetched—reported
instances range from the infamous CONTELPRO operation of the
1960s and '70578 to more recent instances of police using government
databases to "stalk women, threaten motorists and settle scores."'" In
such a scenario, the use of social network analysis is only one compo-
nent of an enduring and significant concern about surveillance of po-
litical or religious expressive associations. 81 Where network analysis
really raises the stakes, though, is when it is used to identify "suspicious"
individuals through their associations. Use of network analysis to iden-
tify associated individuals is the focus of this Article.
2. Targeted Link Analysis to Uncover and Categorize Associations
A targeted link analysis begins with a particular "suspicious" indi-
vidual and analyzes the web of relationships in which that individual is
embedded.82 In the applications at issue in this Article, the relation-
ships would be identified using communications traffic data, though
other data could be used to supplement it. Individuals would be
treated as "nodes" in a communications network." Links would be
added between nodes in the network when there are telephone calls
or email messages between them.'" Depending on the analysis algo-
rithm, the link might be weighted more heavily the more often the
two individuals have communicated or if there are other known con-
nections between them. 85 Importantly, a network of communications
can be mapped out like this even if law enforcement officials have no
access to the contents of the communications.
One purpose of targeted "link analysis" would be to identify and
separate out the associational groups to which the target individual
78 Fisher, supra note 11, at 631.
ao See Fisher, supra note 11, at 623-34 (providing a historical overview of overreaching
political surveillance); M. L. Elrick, Cops Tap Database to Harass, Intimidate: Misuse Among
Police Frequent, Say Some, but Punishments Rare, DETROIT FREE PuEss, July 31,2001, at Al.
81 See generally Fisher, supra note II (analyzing politically motivated surveillance).
82 Taipale, supn7 note 72, at 75; van Meter, supra note 7, at 70-72; Kathleen M. Carley,
Dynamic Network Analysis for Counter-Terrorism 15-16, http://www.spconumuiuc.edu/
TECLAB/aon/CarleyPaper.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2008).
Taipale, supra note 72, at 75; van Meter, supra note 7, at 70-72; Carley, supra note 82,
at 15-16.
Taipale, supra note 72, at 75; van Meter, supra note 7, at 70-72; Carley, supra note 82,
at 15-16.
85 Taipale, supra note 72, at 75; van Meter, supra note 7, at 70-72; Carley, supra note 82,
at 15-16.
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belongs by using the patterns of connections centered on the target
individual.86 For example, suppose the target individual communi-
cates with her family, her religious community, a political group, and a
terrorist organization. Because the target individual communicates
with all of these groups, her own traffic data alone is probably not suf-
ficient to distinguish them. To separate these groups, the network
analyst will want to use not only the target individual's traffic records,
but the communications traffic records of those she has called or
entailed, those they have called and emailed, and so forth. Network
analysis algorithms use the communications patterns between these
second and third order individuals to determine how the target indi-
vidual's contacts are related to one another: it is anticipated that the
family members will tend to call the target individual and each other,
but not the political group members, and so forth. This is the kind of
investigation that is suggested by a recent report that the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation (the "FBI") had sought call records from Verizon
"not just on original targets and the people they had called, but on
everyone that those people in turn had called."87
Link analysis is more intrusive than studying a previously identified
network because it may cast suspicion on individuals, who previously
have not been targeted, solely on the basis of their communications
with the targeted individual—or even solely based on communications
with those who communicate with the targeted individual. Indeed, that
is its purpose. Because even target individuals who are rightly suspected
of criminal or terrorist activity are generally part of a variety of social
groups, targeted link analysis is likely to expose and analyze many en-
tirely legitimate and innocent associations. Of course, if the target is
mistakenly or maliciously selected, only innocent associations will be
revealed.
Like "transactional surveillance" involving data aggregation more
generally, link analysis threatens individual autonomy and has potential
chilling effects because it may expose associations with groups that may
be socially disfavored or simply discordant with an individual's public
"persona."88 Just as "dataveillance" can chill an individual's experimen-
86 Carley, supra note 82, at 15-16.
87 Eric Lichtblau, Phone Utilities Won't Give Details About Eavesdropping, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
16, 2007, at A21.
88 See, e.g., SOLOVE, supra note 6, at 44-47; Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational
vacy and the Subject as Objec t, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1425 (2000). See generally Slobogin, Transac-
tion Surveillance, supra note 6 (discussing the scope and regulation of transactional surveil-
lance).
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tation with particular ideas or pastimes, 89 relational surveillance can
chill tentative associations and experimentation with various group
identities. Accuracy is also an issue with link analysis. 90 The data itself
may give an inaccurate picture of the relationships (it is not always clear
who is actually using a particular phone number or Internet account,
for example) and the network analysis algorithm will not always parti-
tion associations correctly. 91 If a targeted individual belongs to a terror-
ist organization, a political organization, and a religious organization,
for example, and those organizations have overlapping memberships,
the network analysis might mistakenly categorize a member of the le-
gitimate political organization as a member of the terrorist organiza-
tion.
Though these caveats suggest that targeted network analysis should
be regulated to protect both privacy and freedom of association, it must
be recognized that traditional policing involves a form of targeted link
analysis. Seeking to uncover possible co-offenders by interrogating the
"known associates" of a suspect is a tried-and-true law enforcement
technique which certainly predates, and survives, the Bill of Rights. The
type of targeted link analysis potentially enabled by digital communica-
tion records and modern data analysis is not merely the equivalent of
this time-tested law enforcement strategy, however. Three things have
changed. First, the ubiquity of digital communications technology and
the availability of inexpensive data storage means that a more and more
complete record of conummications traffic is available or might be
made available if data retention were mandated. Second, the science of
network analysis is developing to permit more sophisticated analysis of
networks of relationships. Third, increasing computational power makes
it possible and relatively inexpensive to analyze increasingly large net-
works. The ease of data acquisition and the possibility of computerized
analysis dramatically broaden the net of relationships that might be
routinely and inexpensively investigated. In the past, as a result of re-
source limitations and sensible investigative techniques, investigators
would likely follow up chains of links between individuals only after
learning something at each stage that warranted the expense and effort
involved in following up. So, for example, upon obtaining a list of
Roger Clarke, Information Technology and Dataveiltance, 31 Comm. ACM 498, 498, 499
(1988) (coining the term "dataveillance").
Slobogin, Government Data Mining, supra note 6, at 7.
91 See, e.g., M. Girvan & M.F.J. Newman, Community Structure in Social and Biological Net-
works, 99 PROC. NATI, ACAD. Sct. 7821, 7823-26 (2002) (providing a discussion of a
clustering algorithm and its accuracy and computational expense).
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phone numbers dialed by a criminal suspect, law enforcement officers
would identify these individuals and follow up only on those who
seemed likely to be involved in criminal activity. The effect of such a
stage-by-stage approach is to limit the range of innocent associations
exposed to government scrutiny, both by limiting intrusion into the
relationships of those whose connections to the target individual are
not suspicious, and by providing information that might exonerate an
erroneously targeted individual at an early stage.
Current digital communications make it easier to take a dragnet
approach to analyzing a large network of communications. Recent
complaints by FBI field offices of being swamped by meaningless
"leads" for counterterrorism investigation suggest that some such drag-
net approach has been taken by the government in recent years. 92 In its
unfettered form, targeted link analysis can involve obtaining and map-
ping out the complete web of relationships surrounding a particular
individual. Such a map might include the communication patterns of
associates of the target, their associates, and so forth, and would be
likely to uncover a much broader swath of legitimate expressive associa-
tion than traditional police work. Indeed., in light of the "small world"
property of many networks, extending the network out a few links from
the center might draw in entire communities. 93
3. Pattern-Based Social Network Analysis
Unlike targeted link analysis, pattern-based analysis has no direct
analog in traditional law enforcement techniques, though it bears
some similarity to the use of profiling to identify suspicious individu-
als. The goal of pattern-based analysis is to identify suspicious groups
from their communications patterns without having an independent
basis to suspect any target individual.94 Pattern-based analysis, like
similar data mining techniques used in other contexts, seeks to iden-
tify patterns and clusters within a large dataset using information im-
plicit in the data, along with historical "examples" of the patterns
sought." For example, one of the most well known uses of data min-
ing is to identify credit card fraud. 96 Data mining techniques find pat-
92 See, e.g., Lowell Bergman et al.. Domestic Surveillance: The Program; Spy Agency Data Af-
ter Sept. 11 Led FEI to Dead Ends, N.Y. Trans, Jan. 17,2006, at Al.
93 See BARABASI, supra note 7, at 41-54 (discussing the 'small world" problem); WArrs,
supra note 7, at 37-42 (same).
" Taipale, supra note 72, at 33.
95 Id. at 22-24.
99 See Swire, supra note 2, at 964.
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terns of transactions (such as a small purchase at a gas station fol-
lowed by an unusually expensive purchase or a rapid succession of
unusually expensive purchases) commonly associated with fraud. 97
Pattern-based analysis could in principle be used to search
through an entire database of communications records, such as the
AT&T database of call traffic data allegedly made available to the
Bush administration. 98 Though it is not known exactly what algo-
rithms for pattern-based analysis have been developed by government
computer scientists, what is known from basic research into network
analysis suggests that computational and algorithmic limitations make
this kind of super-surveillance more of a dream (or nightmare) than a
reality in the near term. A more likely application of pattern-based
analysis might be to a class of individuals—such as a religious, ethnic,
or political group or a geographic community—believed particularly
likely to include a criminal or terrorist subgroup.
Pattern-based analysis raises many very troubling issues relating
both to the broad swath of communications that must be involved by
the very nature of the analysis and to the likelihood of errors. Govern-
ment attempts to identify criminal or terrorist networks through pat-
tern-based data mining are likely to be far less effective and have far
more negative consequences than typical commercial data mining
schemes such as those used to fight credit card fraud or to target adver-
tisin g.99
A first stage of pattern-based analysis would seek to identify rela-
tively strongly associated groups in a traffic data network using a clus-
tering-type algorithm. 19° A second stage would look for "signatures" of a
particular type of group (such as a criminal or terrorist network) either
by analyzing previous examples or using some kind of theoretical
model."' Once such signatures are identified, existing networks can be
probed for "matching" associations. 102 Pattern-based network analysis
can be highly intrusive since it seeks to find a few malevolent associa-
tions in a haystack of much more numerous legitimate relationships.
Clustering algorithms will reveal vast numbers of legitimate associa-
tional groups along with those malevolent groups. Some of these will be
97 See id.; Keefe, supra note 7.
99 See Hepting, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 978-80.
99
 Id.; Slobogin, Government Data Mining, supra note 6, at 7; Swire, supra note 2, at 964;
Keefe, supra note 7; cf. Taipale, supra note 72, at 72.
tao Taipale, supra note 72, at 28-29, 34, 60-61.
101 Id. at 34, 46, 48, 60-63.
102 Id.
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associations that have, for perfectly legal reasons, decided not to . iden-
tify themselves by membership lists and public "platforms" or agendas
or have not gelled into formal associations. Network analysis can thus
provide the equivalent of association membership lists without a direct
request or even notice to members of a group that the government has
taken an interest in their activities. 103
Exposing legitimate, yet unpopular or fringe, associations poses a
variety of threats to freedom of association. Associations, no less than
individuals, can be targeted by government officials for nefarious rea-
sons once they are identified. Further, as discussed above, the poten-
tial that an individual's association with nonmainstream groups or
explorations of nonmainstream ideas will be exposed to the govern-
ment threatens to chill association even more than the exposure of a
membership list of a traditional group. Commercial data mining ac-
tivities for targeting advertising or combating fraud mostly focus on
collecting information about individuals rather than associations,
though this is probably changing with the popularity of social net
 sites, such as Facebook and MySpace. There is clearly a dif-
ference, however, when the miner is the government and the traffic
records come from the providers of basic communication facilities
such as telephone and email. One can opt out of social networking
sites entirely or limit the associations reflected in them. One should
not have to opt out of the telephone system or, in today's world, out of
Internet communication in order to pursue legitimate, but nonmain-
stream, expressive associations.
Pattern-based analysis is also likely to be riddled with errors. The
accuracy of pattern-based analysis of a network depends on the accu-
racy of the underlying data, the accuracy of the clustering algorithm
used to map out associational groups within a network of traffic data,
and the accuracy of the pattern or model used to identify suspicious or
malevolent groups. 104 Telephone and internet traffic data are accurate
only to the extent that a particular number or account can be attached
to a particular individual. More importantly, clustering algorithms
(rules for identifying groups) applied to large networks are not particu-
larly accurate. 105 They are, in fact, least likely to be accurate in identify-
ing loosely coupled organizations, such as many criminal and terrorist
organizations that seek to minimize the density of traceable communi-
1 °5 See infra notes 227-275 and accompanying text (discussing cases regarding associa-
tion membership lists).
104 See Slobogin, Government Data Mining, supra note 6, at 7.
105 See, e.g., Girvan & Newman, supra note 91, at 7823-26.
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cations between members, 106
 The development of network clustering
algorithms is an area of current research and algorithms are certain to
improve.m To some extent, however, these difficulties are inherent in
the structure of social networks. As mentioned above, social networks
tend to be very closely connected (perhaps they are even "small world
networks"))°8 This makes the network of associations difficult to disen-
tangle as a computational matter. Mistaken identifications are inevita-
ble.
Once associative groups are identified, there remains the ques-
tion of distinguishing malevolent associations from legitimate associa-
tions. Here the problems are quite deep. Terrorist events, for exam-
ple, are thankfully rare. This means, however, that coming up with
accurate "patterns" for terrorist networks is a difficult, if not impossi-
ble task.l 09 This situation can be contrasted with the situation involv-
ing data mining to detect credit card fraud. Credit card companies
have a lot of experience with fraud and much of it follows similar pat-
terns, so the models of "fraudulent purchasing behavior" that are
used in the analysis can be reasonably accurate.n°
Even if a set of model network properties could be derived that
would fit most possible terrorist networks (thus minimizing the prob-
lem of false negatives), there is likely to be a huge problem with false
positives. There is, at least at this point, little reason to assume that
terrorist networks will have different relational structures than many
other legitimate networks." Moreover, to the extent that the network
structure of terrorist networks reflects their most obvious difference
from typical social networks—their covert nature—it may very well be
similar to the structures of the most sensitive of political networks,
those involving unpopular ideas or disfavored groups.
I" Greenblatt et al., supra note 15, at 344 ("Covert organizations generally do not have
many paths of communications flow between individuals. Redundant paths lead to in-
creased risk of exposure or capture."); Valdis E. Krebs, Uncloaking Terrorist Networks, 7 FIRST
MONDAY, Apr. 2002, http://fis-stmonday.org/issues/issue7_4/krebs/index.hunl  (mapping
the network of relations between the September 11th hijackers and discussing the diffi-
culty in identifying terrorist networks before the fact).
107 See, e.g., Filippo Radicchi et al., Defining and Identifying Communities in Networks, 101
l'ROC, NAT'L ACAD. Sm. 2658,2658 (2004).
108 See BARA BAS I, supra note 7, at 41-54; WATTS, supra note 7, at 37-42.
09 See, e.g. Keefe, supra note 7; Krebs, supra note 106; see also Jonathan D. Farley, Edito-
rial, The N.S.A.'s Math Problem, NY Timm, May 16,2006, at A25.
110 See Swire, supra note 2, at 964-65; Keefe, supra note 7.
I" See Greenblatt et al., supra note 15, at 331-33,344 (discussing the possibility of de-
tecting terrorist networks on the basis of their "covert" nature); Keefe, supra note 7.
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Pattern-based mining of traffic data is thus likely to be plagued
with both false positives and false negatives to an unacceptable de-
gree. Despite these problems, however, law enforcement entities may
be motivated to employ these methods even when they are not "ready
for prime time." Here again, the contrast with data mining in the
credit card fraud context is instructive. Credit card companies gener-
ally pay the cost of false negatives (failure to identify fraud) because
most reimburse the victims of credit card fraud for the cost of fraudu-
lent purchases and thereby internalize those costs. False positives, on
the other hand, are generally resolved with little difficulty simply by
contacting the card holder and verifying the suspect transactions. 112
The ramifications of a false positive are minimal in the credit card
fraud context. 113 The ramifications of errors are even more minimal
in the advertising context, where the worst that can happen is that the
"wrong" individual receives or does not receive an advertisement.
Like credit card companies, law enforcement entities—or at least
those higher-ranking individuals who would make the decisions to em-
ploy pattern-based analysis—are likely to internalize the expected costs
of false negatives (failure to identify a malevolent network) and to be
much less sensitive to the costs of false positives. There are certainly
social costs involved in following up useless leads 114—indeed the mone-
tary costs alone could be substantial—but although law enforcement
officers on the front lines may complain about them, they may not be
highly salient to those making the decisions about whether to pursue
high tech law enforcement strategies (who are probably highly sensitive
to political pressures often reflecting the glamour of "security theater"
more than the mundane day-to-day pursuit of traditional investigative
procedures). 115
Unlike in the case of credit card fraud, however, the costs of false
positives to those brought under suspicion by an inaccurate network
analysis would be large. Unfortunately, those costs might not be felt by
the government officials who decide whether to use the methods. Al-
though public opinion might react to the harm caused by false positives
us Swire, supra note 2, at 964.
us Id.
114 See Bergman et al., supra note 92.
115 See, e.g. BRUCE SCIINEIER, BEYOND FEAR: THINKING SENSIBLY Mom- SECURVIT IN
AN UNCERTAIN 'WORLD 38-40 (2003) (discussing the idea that the concept of security is
partially a state of mind, and thus„some countermeasures are intended to provide merely
the feeling of security rather than actual security; or in other words, they are nothing
more than security theater").
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if the methodology is sufficiently flawed that it ensnares large enough
numbers of innocents, it is quite possible—probably likely—that false
positives will be concentrated on socially disfavored groups. Thus, the
hidden costs of unnecessary and intrusive investigations and the chill-
ing of legitimate association, though potentially great and of great im-
portance to a democratic society, might not cause sufficient discomfort
to the majority of citizens to result in a political rejection of flawed net-
work analysis methods. False positives, in the form either of inaccurate
assignment of individuals to malevolent groups or of inaccurate charac-
terization of groups as illegitimate, thus have a high potential to chill
association, especially association of the emergent and tentative sort
that is of increasing importance in the current technological milieu.
Network analysis also promotes a pernicious tendency toward the
accumulation of increasing amounts of data about individuals and
their interactions. When network analysis is ineffective there will al-
ways be a tendency for law enforcement to argue (with some basis)
that more data would improve the accuracy of the analysis. Unrealistic
expectations about the extent to which additional data can improve
the analysis are likely to lead to the amassing of increasingly pervasive
databases of personal and relational information in the hope of find-
ing a foolproof method of identifying malevolent associations. The
tendency to take steps in the name of security without much regard
for whether they are worth the social and economic costs is already
evident in other arenas. 116
III. THE FAILURE OF EXISTING LEGAL PARADIGMS TO PROTECT
ASSOCIATION IN A NETWORKED SOCIETY
Relational surveillance is particularly threatening to democracy
because of the critical role that collective behavior plays in effectuating
political and social change. Complete relational surveillance could
make it virtually impossible (or at least impractical) for citizens to asso-
ciate anonymously to pursue a particular social goal and could deter
even the exploration of controversial ideas and positions. The U.S. Su-
preme Court has recognized the importance to democracy of citizens'
ability to associate away from the prying eyes of government by striking
down as unconstitutional various government requirements that politi-
cal groups turn over their membership lists. 117 Subpoenas for associa-
tion membership lists are also frequently quashed on First Amendment
336 Sec id.
17 See infra notes 227-275 and accompanying text.
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grounds. 118 This existing protection from disclosure of membership
lists, however, is no longer sufficient to uphold the right to associational
freedom. These are exciting times precisely because of the opportuni-
ties for new ways of associating to pursue collective goals that are pro-
vided by the Internet and other communication technologies. Rela-
tional surveillance threatens to undermine the potential of these new
ways of associating by providing the government with means to obtain
information about group membership, which evade the legal strictures
on direct inquiry to a traditional association. Freedom of association
doctrine has yet to grapple with the ways in which technology has
changed associational patterns. Meanwhile, surveillance law has failed
to develop a jurisprudence of freedom of association because surveil-
lance questions have been analyzed solely from within a privacy para-
digm. 119 Because surveillance law has focused on individual privacy and
neglected' First Amendment concerns, it provides its lowest protection
to noncontent, traffic data that is in third party hands, leaving a major
gap in current protection of the right to freedom of association.'"
A. The Fourth Amendment and Relational Surveillance
The Fourth Amendment protects `It] he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures." 121 Under Supreme Court case law, the in-
quiry as to whether there has been an "unreasonable search" begins
with a determination as to whether a "search" has occurred. 122 Rather
than relying on common usage of the word "search," the law holds that
there has been no search unless the government has intruded on an
"expectation of privacy," which is both subjectively present and objec-
tively reasonable. 123 Unless there has been a search in this sense, the
Fourth Amendment has no application. 124 Once there has been a
search, the Fourth Amendment, by default, requires a warrant based on
probable cause. 125 The case law, however, provides numerous excep-
tions to the warrant requirement based on factors such as exigency,
119 See infra notes 227-275 and accompanying text.
119 SW infra notes 121-207 and accompanying text.
120 See infra notes 121-207 and accompanying text.
121 U.S. CoNs•r. amend. IV.
122 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,353 {1967).
123 Id. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring).
124 See Slobogin, Government Data Mining, supra note 6, at 11.
129 U.S. ConsT. amend. IV.
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administrative necessity; "special needs," and so forth, most of which
are beyond the scope of this Article. 126
The Fourth Amendment as applied thus far, and even as supple-
mented by statutory regulation, provides little protection against rela-
tional surveillance because the Supreme Court generally has not
found a reasonable expectation of privacy either in information that
has been conveyed to a third party or in communication traffic
data. 127 Thus, it will be difficult to convince a court that relational sur-
veillance using traffic data involves a "search" at all given that traffic
data almost by definition is obtained from communications interme-
diaries. Even if such relational surveillance were deemed a search, an
argument could be made that broad-based network analysis is permis-
sible under the Fourth Amendment's "special needs" doctrine. 128
A complex statutory regime supplements • the Fourth Amend-
ment's protections against government surveillance, providing some-
what greater protection in some cases. 129 That regime, however, gives its
lowest protection to noncontent traffic data and also distinguishes be-
tween real-time interception and the analysis of stored records. 13° Rela-
tional surveillance thus relies almost exclusively on types of information
to which the current surveillance law regime affords the lowest levels of
protection.
1. The Limited Protection Available to Information "Conveyed" to a
Third Party
For regulating relational surveillance, the most troublesome as-
pect of Fourth Amendment doctrine as currently conceived is that it
provides virtually no protection to information that has been "con-
veyed to a third party." 131 The understanding is that, by conveying in-
I=6 See Christopher Slobogin, Let's Not Bury Terry: A Call for Rejuvenation of the Propor-
tionality Principle, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1053,1062-66 (1998) [hereinafter Slobogin, Let's
Not Bury Terry] (discussing the "danger" exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement); Slobogin, Transaction Surveillance, supra note 6, at 150 1)11.32-34 (citing cases
regarding "stop and frisk" and "special needs" exceptions to the general warrant require-
ment); Steinbock, supra note 6, at 39-41 (discussing administrative search exceptions to
the warrant requirement).
127 See infra notes 131-153,176-179 and accompanying text.
128 See infra notes 161-170 and accompanying text.
129 See infra notes 171-207 and accompanying text.
ISO Sec infra notes 171-207 and accompanying text.
151 See Bellia, supra note 6, at 1402; Henderson, Learning from All Fifty Stater, supra note
6, at 373; Slobogin, Transaction Surveillance, supra note 6, at 149-66; Swire, Katz is Dead,
supra note 6, at 910-12; Zittrain, supra note 6, at 83-84.
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formation to a third party, an individual "assumes the risk" that the
third party might disclose that information to others. 192 In its opin-
ions, the Supreme Court has taken a very broad view of the circum-
stances under which information has been "conveyed" to a third party
and for the most part has not been responsive to arguments based on
expectations of confidentiality.'"
In 1976, in the seminal case of United States v. Mai; for example,
the Court determined that an individual had no Fourth Amendment
interest in his bank records, which were deemed "business records of
the banks."134 The Court reasoned that the information held by the
bank was regularly exposed to bank employees in the ordinary course
of business and as a result, the depositor "takes the risk" that an em-
ployee might choose to convey that information to the government. 135
The Court was unswayed by arguments that banks have contractual
and fiduciary obligations of confidentiality with regard to the re-
cords.'" Particularly troubling was the Court's refusal to condition its
analysis on the fact that the government required banks to maintain
the records in question to comply with the Bank Secrecy Act. 137
A few years later in 1979, in Smith u Maryland, the Court consid-
ered whether installation of a "pen register" to record the telephone
numbers dialed from a suspect's home was a "search" subject to
Fourth Amendment protection. 138 Again the Court found no "reason-
able expectation of privacy" and hence no Fourth Amendment pro-
tection.'" The Court based its holding on the fact that "[t]elephone
users, in sum, typically know that they must convey numerical infor-
mation to the phone company; that the phone company has facilities
for recording this information; and that the phone company does in
fact record this information for a variety of legitimate business pm--
poses."14° Stating that it "consistently has held that a person has no
legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns
over to third parties," the Court held that by dialing the phone num-
ber, the petitioner "voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the
132 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435,
443 (1976).
133 See Smith, 492 U.S. at 743-44; Miller; 425 U.S. at 440-43.
1 .54 425 U.S. at 940, 442-45.
133 Id. at 443.
136 Id.
"7 See id. at 441.
138 442 U.S. at 736.
'" Id. at 742.
140 Id. at 743-44.
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telephone company and 'exposed' that information to its equipment
in the ordinary course of business. In so doing, petitioner assumed
the risk that the company would reveal to police the numbers he di-
aled."141 The Court rejected the argument that, because of automa-
tion, no human being at the phone company is actually exposed to
the phone number when it is dialed, stating that "Me are not in-
clined to hold that a different constitutional result is required because
the telephone company has decided to automate. "142
Similarly in 1984, in Securities & Exchange Commission v. Jerry T
O'Brien, Inc., the Court summarized its view that "[w] hen a person
communicates information to a third party even on the understanding
that the communication is confidential, he cannot object if the third
party conveys that information or records thereof to law enforcement
authorities. " 143
A potential crack in the third party doctrine has appeared in the
context of state hospital diagnostic tests. In 2001, in Ferguson v. City of
Charleston, the Court held that "[t] he reasonable expectation of privacy
enjoyed by the typical patient undergoing diagnostic tests in a hospital
is that the results of those tests will not be shared with nonmedical per-
sonnel without her consent."144 It is unclear whether this finding of a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the context of a confidential doc-
tor-patient relationship has any application outside of the medical con-
text, where privacy interests are deemed to be especially strong. 146
The doctrine that information conveyed to a third party loses any
Fourth Amendment protection has come under increasing criticism
in light of the growing extent to which private information is neces-
sarily and routinely handled by (and recorded by) data intermediaries
in the age of the Internet and in light of the increasing digitalization
of voice communications. Indeed, in 1967, in Katz v. United Slates, the
seminal case extending Fourth Amendment protection beyond the
home and the source of the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test,
the Court held that the Fourth Amendment precludes government
wiretapping without a warrant. 146 Yet, telephone conversations are
141 Id. at 744.
142 Id. at 744-45.
143 467 U.S. 735, 743 (1984).
144 532 U.S. 67, 78 (2001).
145 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603-04 (1977) (holding that the patient identifica-
tion requirement of a state law mandating the filing of an official form with the State
Health Department when certain drugs were prescribed did not constitute an invasion of
any right or liberty protected by the Fourth Amendment).
146 389 U.S. at 353, 357-58.
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certainly conveyed to the person on the other end of the line. More-
over, they travel over telephone company wires and are handled by
the phone company en route.
Outside of the communications context, moreover, the Fourth
Amendment has been held to apply to physical property even when it
has been entrusted to third parties for storage and transport. 147
 Thus,
courts have recognized a reasonable expectation of privacy in letters
entrusted to the postal service, rented rooms, storage units, and sealed
containers."8 In the ordinary course of business the postal carriers,
landlords, and so forth have no reason or contractual right to meddle
with the contents of the relevant letters, apartments, or containers. 149
These precedents suggest two plausible limitations on the third
party doctrine. First, if Katz itself is to remain good law, the third party
doctrine should apply only when the government obtains the infor-
mation from the third party to whom it was conveyed. Thus, a partici-
pant in a telephone conversation may be subpoenaed to testify , as to
what was said even though the conversation could not be wiretapped
without a warrant. Second, the third party doctrine should apply at
most when the conveyance to a third party is for that third party's use
in the ordinary course of business. When a third party merely stores
or carries property on behalf of another, the owner of the property
may retain a Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy if the third
party has no business reason to look into the contents. Arguably, then,
the third party doctrine should be limited so that the owners of com-
puter files and email archives maintained by ISPs and other interme-
diaries retain Fourth Amendment interests in their contents. The Su-
147 See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984); Stoner v. California, 376
U.S. 483, 489-90 (1964); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 616-18 (1961); United
States vjohns, 851 F.2d 1131, 1133-35 (9th Cir. 1988).
148
 See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 114 (noting that, with regard to letters entrusted to the U.S.
Postal Service, "[l]etters and other sealed packages are in the general class of effects in
which the public at large has a legitimate expectation of privacy; warrantless searches of
such effects are presumptively unreasonable"); Stoner, 376 U.S. at 489-90 (holding that
search of hotel room without warrant violated Fourth Amendment, despite the fact that
one who engages a hotel room gives implied permission to hotel personnel to enter to
perform their duties); Chapman, 365 U.S. at 616-18 (holding that search of house occu-
pied by tenant violated Fourth Amendment, despite fact that landlord had authority to
enter house for some purposes); Johns, 851 E2d at 1133-35 (implicitly recognizing reason-
able expectation of privacy in rented storage unit).
149 This view of this case law is consistent with cases in which there was no reasonable
expectation of privacy because, for example, rent had not been paid or property had
seemingly been abandoned. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 472 F.2d 901, 903 (9th Cir.
1972). In the ordinary course of business, landlords can be expected to intrude upon the
property under such circumstances. See id.
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preme Court has yet to consider this question. An appellate court has
recently agreed with this analysis, finding that the Fourth Amendment
protects email stored with an ISP, but rehearing en bane has been
granted in that case.I 5°
One might also argue that, even if obtaining records of traffic data
is not a search, applying network analysis to the data and thus disclos-
ing previously unknown patterns of association is a search. In 2001, in
Kyllo v. United States, the Court held that using a thermal imager to ob-
tain images of what is going on in the interior of a home constituted a
search, despite the fact that the images were based on thermal data col-
lected in a public space outside of the house.'" Arguably, network
analysis technology; like the thermal imager in Kyllo, produces new in-
formation that is not in the hands of the third parties who have col-
lected the traffic data. 152 If the associational structure can be discerned
only by applying sophisticated data mining technology, perhaps there is
a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in those associations.
This argument, even if successful, is of limited use. Any reasonable
expectation of privacy in associations "revealed" only by network analy-
sis could only extend to those emergent associations whose structure
and membership were unknown even to members. Once information
about one's membership in an organization is shared with third par-
ties—such as the other members of the organization—the third party
doctrine as currently applied would likely destroy any reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy. Moreover, Kyllo is premised on strong traditional
rights of privacy in the home,'" making it a thin reed on which to base
an argument for Fourth Amendment protection against relational sur-
veillance using computerized network analysis.
2. The Limited Protection Available for Noncontent Data
Whatever the eventual result regarding the contents of email and
other files maintained by third parties, courts seem unlikely to find a
reasonable expectation of privacy in addressing information and other
traffic data per se, if for no other reason than that it is conveyed "to"
the intermediary for its use in the ordinary course of business, and is
thus apparently comparable to the phone numbers collected by the
15° Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 455, 473 (6th Cir. 2007), reh'g en bane granted, No.
06-4092, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 23741, at *1--2 (Gth Cir. Oct. 9, 2007).
151 533 U.S. 27, 30, 40 (2001).
152 Id. at 40.
153 Id. at 31, 40.
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pen register in Smith. 154 In reasoning that there is no Fourth Amend-
ment protection for phone numbers dialed, the Court relied in part on
the fact that pen register data does not disclose the content of conver-
sations. 155
More recently, courts have applied a similar analysis to Internet
subscriber data and traffic information. 156 For example, in an unpub-
lished decision in 2000, United States v. Hambrick, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit held that an Internet user did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his subscriber information. 157 The
court opined that
[wlhile under certain circumstances, a person may have an
expectation of privacy in content information, a person does
not have an interest in the account information given to the
ISP in order to establish the e-mail account, which is noncon-
tent information. Disclosure of this noncontent information
to a third party destroys the privacy expectation that might
have existed previously. 158
Similarly, in 2008, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in
United States v. Forrester, held that "e-mail and Internet users have no ex-
pectation of privacy in the to/from addresses of their messages .or the
IP addresses of the websites they visit because they should know that
this information is provided to and used by Internet service providers
"159
The difficulty with the distinction between "content" and "noncon-
tent" information is that it does not recognize the extent to which a
network analysis of traffic data might reveal patterns of association that
are, as discussed below, protected by the First Amendment and critical
to democratic liberty' 60 Moreover, even though an intermediary makes
use of bits and pieces of traffic data in the ordinary course of routing
and delivering communications, the associations derived by network
analysis algorithms would never be apparent from the ordinary busi-
ness uses to which intermediaries put traffic data. It is therefore unrea-
154 See 442 U.S. at 743-44.
155 Id. at 741-43.
159 Unites States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 509-10 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v.
Hambrick, No. 99-4793, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 18665, at *11-12 (4th Cir. Aug. 3, 2000),
157 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 18665, at *11-12.
'58 Id.
159 51 2 F.3d at 510.
960 See infra notes 208-275 and accompanying text.
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sonable to act as though the results of network analysis are disclosed to
the provider in the ordinary course of business in any meaningful
sense.
3. "Special Needs" Searches
Even if network analysis of traffic data to reveal associational pat-
terns were recognized as a search, however, it is unclear how Fourth
Amendment doctrine would handle a broad program of warrantless
and suspicionless relational surveillance. The Supreme Court has rec-
ognized exceptions to the warrant requirement for certain adminis-
trative and regulatory searches, such as various health and safety in-
spection programs. 161 In addition, "special needs" may, in certain
exceptional circumstances, justify a search policy designed to serve
non-law enforcement ends. 162 Though a special needs search may in-
volve law enforcement to some degree, the Court "decline [s] to ap-
prove a program whose primary purpose is ultimately indistinguish-
able from the general interest in crime control:163
The purpose of a program of relational surveillance, however, is
unlikely to be "ultimately indistinguishable from the general interest in
crime control."'" Its purpose might be to avert terrorist activity, for ex-
ample. Given the importance of this objective and its focus on prevent-
ing future harm rather than on solving prior crimes, the prevention of
terrorism might be deemed an appropriate "special need" justifying a
deviation from the warrants and individualized suspicion requirements
of the Fourth Amendment despite the fact that law enforcement pur-
poses are also involved.' 66 The inclusion by various courts of DNA data-
bases within the "special needs" exception suggests courts' willingness
to stretch the definition of non-law enforcement purposes where suffi-
ciently important government interests appear to be at stake.'
A "special need" search must be reasonable under a balancing test
that balances the state interest against the intrusion on individual pri-
lei See, e.g., Mich. Dept of State Police v. Sits, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990); Skinner v. Ry.
Labor Executives' Assn, 489 U.S. 602, 634 (1989); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 333
(1985) (IT] he Fourth Amendment applies to searches conducted by school authorities,
but the special needs of the school environment require assessment of the legality of such
searches against a standard less exacting than that of probable cause.").
16.2 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 79-84.
163 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000).
164 See id.
166 See id. ("IT)he Fourth Amendment would almost certainly permit an appropriately
tailored roadblock set up to thwart an imminent terrorist attack ....").
166 Sce United States v. Hook, 971 F.3d 766, 772-73 (7th Cir. 2006).
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vacy. 167 To determine whether a search qualifies as a special need,
"[t]he considerations that are examined . • . include the governmental
interest involved, the nature of the intrusion, the privacy expectations
of the object of the search, and the manner in which the search is exe-
cuted:168 The difficulty in using this balancing test to evaluate a rela-
tional surveillance program is that the test is not designed to take ac-
count of the important First Amendment interests implicated by
relational surveillance. As discussed in more detail below, the First
Amendment generally requires a compelling government interest and
least restrictive means test before disclosure of an association member-
ship list may be required. 169 No expectation of privacy in the member-
ship list is necessary to trigger First Amendment protection.'" Perhaps
the special needs balancing test could be modified to take First
Amendment interests into account, but in that case direct application
of the First Amendment to evaluate the relational surveillance seems
less contrived. Moreover, adapting the balancing test would not solve
the significant hurdle of demonstrating that there has been a Fourth
Amendment search in the first place. On balance, then, Fourth
Amendment doctrine is an insufficient means to regulate relational
surveillance so as to ensure that it complies with the Constitution.
B. Low Protection for Traffic Data Under Surveillance Statutes
Congress has supplemented the Fourth Amendment's protections
with statutory surveillance law."' This statutory law generally follows a
tiered scheme in which the level of protection is keyed to the third
party and content/noncontent distinctions.'" Moreover, the statutory
167 See Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1989);
Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523,536-37 (1967).
168 Hook, 471 F.3d at 772.
199 See infra notes 208-275 and accompanying text.
1 " See infra notes 227-275 and accompanying text.
17 ' Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508,100 Stat. 1848
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.); Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act, 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-1871 (West 2003 & Stipp. II 2007); sec also Dierdre K. Mulligan,
Reasonable Expectations in Electronic Communications: A Critical Perspective on the Electronic Commu-
nications Privacy Act, 72 CA°, WASH. L. REV. 1557,1559-71 (2004) (providing a detailed dis-
cussion of the history, adoption, and construction of the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act). The electronic surveillance law created by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
can be broken down into three statutes: the Wiretap Act. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2511-2522 (West
2000 & Supp. 2007), the Pen Register statute, 18 U.S.C. §.§ 3121-3127 (2000 & Supp. IV
2004), and the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701-2711 (West 2000 & Supp.
2007); Mulligan, =pm, at 1565.
172 See Mulligan, supra note 171, at 1565-66.
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scheme introduces a further distinction between real-time interception
of communications and obtaining stored records.' Surveillance stat-
utes regulate government acquisition of communications information
in the law enforcement and foreign intelligence contexts. 174 For the
most part, a lower threshold applies to foreign intelligence surveil-
lance, which is authorized by a special secret court under FISA. 175 Both
regimes, however, provide only minimal protection to traffic data.
Thus, the statutory regulatory scheme, like Fourth Amendment doc-
trine, provides its lowest protection when faced with government acqui-
sition of traffic data.
1. Statutory Regulation of Real-Time Acquisition of Traffic Data
Traffic data may be obtained either by real-time tracking or by ac-
cess to stored records of communications carriers.'" Real-time inter-
ception of communications content is traditionally highly constrained. 177
Thus, a "superwarrant" is required under the Wiretap Act before law
enforcement agents can directly intercept the content of communica-
tions. 178 A strong showing of probable cause and particularity is re-
quired to obtain a wiretap order and the orders are granted subject to
severe limitations and continuing review.'" By contrast, government
officials may record traffic data in real time based on a much lower
standard. 188 Real-time acquisition of traffic data for law enforcement
purposes is governed by 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127, also known as the
"pen register" or "trap and trace" statute because of its origins as a
means of regulating particular technologies for intercepting dialed
telephone numbers. 181 In its current incarnation, the statute - defines
"pen register" and "trap and trace device" broadly to encompass any
means of recording addressing or routing information for any tele-
phone or Internet cormmunications. 182 Thus:
os Ste id. at 1565.
174 See Bellia, supra note 6, at 1376-77.
171 50 U.S.C.A. § 1803; see Lich thlau & Johnston, supra note 39.
176 See Bellia, supra note 6, at 1381.
177 See, e.g., Smith, 442 U.S. at 741-42 (distinguishing protection of content of commu-
nications vs. 110/1C011tent information).
178 See 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2000); Mulligan, supra note 171, at 1561.
179 See 18 U.S.C. § 2518.
186 See id. §§ 3121-3127 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
161 See id.; Smith, 442 U.S. at 736
102 18 U.S.C. § 3127.
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(3) the term "pen register" means a device or process which
records or decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling
information transmitted by an instrument or facility from
which a wire or electronic communication is transmitted, pro-
vided, however, that such information shall not include the
contents of any communication . . .
(4) the term "trap and trace device" means a device or
process which captures the incoming electronic or other im-
pulses which identify the originating number or other dialing,
routing, addressing, and signaling information reasonably
likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic communi-
cation, provided, however, that such information shall not in-
clude the contents of any communication .... 188
Using these definitions, the statute prohibits the use of pen regis-
ters and trap and trace devices unless an application for a court order is
made by specified law enforcement officers. 184 To obtain such a court
order, the officer must certify only "that the information likely to he
obtained is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation being con-
ducted by that agency." 185 Upon receiving an appropriate application
containing such a certification, a court must issue the necessary or-
der. 188 In the context of international terrorism, an alternative ap-
proach is available. Under FISA, 187 a pen register or trap and trace or-
der may be obtained in relation to an investigation "to protect against
international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, provided
that such investigation of a United States person is not conducted solely
upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the
Constitution" upon a mere certification that the information is "rele-
vant to an ongoing investigation to protect against international terror ,:
ism or clandestine intelligence activities." 188
Thus, although government interception of communication Con-
tent is for the most part permitted only under very stringent, court-
supervised conditions, traffic data may be intercepted even if it is
merely "relevant" to an investigation. 188
'al Id. § 3127(3)4).
184 Id. §§ 3122-3123.
10 Id. § 3122 (emphasis added).
10 Id. § 3123.
187 50 U.S.C.A. § 1842 (West 2003 & Supp. 2007).
ra id. § 1842(a) (1), (c) (2).
10 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2000), with 50 U.S.C.A. § 1842(c) (2).
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2. Statutory Regulation of Acquisition of Stored Traffic Data
The most likely means by which government would obtain traffic
data for network analysis is not real-time interception, but acquisition
of records maintained by a communications carrier. Such an acquisi-
tion is at issue in the lawsuit against AT&T, for example, which alleges
that AT&T, in contravention of statutory prohibitions on divulging
traffic data,
has provided the government with direct access to the con-
tents of [various call record] databases that it manages ... by
providing the government with copies of the information in
the databases and/or by giving the government access to Day-
tona's [a sophisticated database management system] query-
ing capabilities and/or some other technology enabling the
government agents to search the databases' contents. 19°
Modern use of digital technology drastically increases the extent to
which traffic data is stored. Telephone companies and ISPs are able to
maintain vast databases recording communications traffic almost in-
definitely To the extent that this stored information is deemed unpro-
tected by constitutional strictures, statutes might in principle be passed
to mandate even more storage of traffic data than these providers
might choose for their own business purposes. The Miller case suggests
that there would be no Fourth Amendment barrier to mandating such
data retention.m If data retention is mandated, even the possibility that
service providers might compete in the marketplace on the basis of
greater protection of privacy by not maintaining traffic data would be
eliminated.
Although the Miller and Smith cases imply that the Fourth
Amendment does not restrict government access to the stored traffic
data used in relational surveillance, surveillance statutes do regulate
the circumstances under which the government can obtain such data 192
and prohibit service providers from disclosing such information in
most circurnstances. 193 The threshold, however, for obtaining commu-
nications traffic data is minimal. Under 18 U.S.C. § 2703, electronic
communications records may be obtained by government officials pur-
199 Complaint at 12, Hewing v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (No. G
01)0672:JCS) available at http://www.eftorg/files/ftlenode/att/att  complaint tu-nended.pdf.
191 Miller, 425 U.S. at 441-43.
In 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2703,2709 (West 2000 & Supp. 2007); see Smith, 492 U.S. at 741-43;
Miller, 425 U.S. at 440-42.
193 18 U.S.C.A. § 2702.
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suant to a court order based on "specific and articulable facts showing
that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the ... records or
other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing
criminal investigation."'" Certain records may also be disclosed pursu-
ant to an administrative, grand jury, or trial subpoena.'"
Even less is required in the national security context, where toll
billing records may be requested using a "national security letter"
("NSL"), which may be issued without judicial oversight by certain FBI
officials.' The request requires only a written certification that.the
records are "relevant to an authorized investigation to protect against
international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, provided
that such an investigation of a United States person is not conducted
solely on the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to
the Constitution of the United States: 197 Other records may be ob-
tainable using the business records provision of FISA.'" For example,
50 U.S.C. § 1861 provides that certain FBI officials may apply
for an order requiring the production of any tangible things
(including books, records, papers, documents, and other
items) for an investigation ... to protect against international
terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, provided that
such investigation of a United States person is not conducted
solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first
amendment to the Constitution. 199
Application for such an order must include "a statement of facts show-
ing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible
things sought are relevant to an authorized investigation . . . to pro-
tect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activi-
ties ...."290
In general, then, traffic data may be obtained by the government
upon a showing of mere "relevance" (sometimes augmented by "mate-
riality") to either a law enforcement investigation or an investigation to
protect against international terrorism.m These requirements of "rele-
194
 Id. § 2703.
195 Id.
196 See id. § 2709.
197 Id.
19s 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861 (West 2003 & Stipp. 2007).
199 Id,
s99
2"t
	 U.S.C.A. §§ 2703, 2709; 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861.
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vance" and "materiality" provide a low hurdle to obtaining traffic data.
Oversight is also minimal, because courts often are required to issue
these orders as long as the proper attestations are made, and in cases
where NSLs may be used no court order is required at all. 2°2 Recent
internal audits of FBI usage of NSLs demonstrate the dangers of such
an unsupervised regime, with NSLs increasingly being used to obtain
personal information concerning American citizens. 203 In a review of
ten percent of the NSLs issued from 2002 through 2005, moreover,
more than one thousand were found to have been issued contrary to
statute or regulations. 204
 Persons to whom NSLs pertain often are given
no notice that the records are being turned over, and third party hold-
ers of the data are in many cases prohibited from disclosing that they
received such a request. 205 This statutory scheme, like the Fourth
Amendment doctrine on which it builds, clearly presumes that the in-
trusiveness of government access to traffic data is minimal.
Relational surveillance using network analysis sits uncomfortably
in this statutory scheme. How many "links" away in the network of
communication must an individual be before his or her traffic data is
no longer "relevant" or "material" to an investigation that begins with
reason for suspicion of some central individual? Does the answer to this
question depend on the algorithm that law enforcement officials in-
tend to employ? How large a sample of the network is needed if, say,
the objective of a link analysis is to understand the role that the central
individual plays in his or her associational network? Even more impor-
tantly, if a pattern analysis is intended, how complete must the network
be before patterns can be classified and nodes clustered in a meaning-
ful way? Arguably, the accuracy of any large scale data analysis algo-
rithm is improved by including more data in the analysis. The scope of
relevance could extend quite far, particularly where law enforcement
interpretation is unfettered by meaningful judicial oversight.
Under current statutes, the potential First Amendment implica-
tions of disclosing traffic data are barely acknowledged. FISA's limita-
tions on investigations "conducted solely upon the basis of activities
2° 2 Sec 18 U.S.C.A. § 2709; 18 U.S.C. § 3123 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
3" Sec Dan Eggen, FBI Found to Misuse Security Letters: 2003-06 Audit Cites Probes of Citi-
zens, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 2008, at A3; John Solomon, FBI Finds It Frequently Overstepped in
CollectingData, WASH. Post, June 14, 2007, at Al.
204
 Solomon, supra note 203.
20S &A e.g., Editorial, My National Security Letter Gag Order, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 2007, at
A17. Note, however, that a district court has ruled that the nondisclosure provision is an un-
constitutional suppression of speech. Doe v. Gonzales, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379, 425 (S.D.N.Y.
2007).
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protected by the first amendment to the Constitution" would apply
only to the most egregious harassment. 2D6 Indeed, without meaningful
judicial oversight, this provision is essentially toothless and unlikely to
deter any law enforcement official bent on reproducing the excesses
of the Hoover era."7 As the next Section explains, the important
freedom of association implications of relational surveillance demand
a more searching First Amendment analysis.
C. Relational Surveillance and the First Amendment
Although the Fourth Amendment and associated surveillance
statutes provide minimal protection against relational surveillance us-
ing traffic data, the First Amendment strongly protects freedom of as-
sociation in other contexts. The Supreme Court's recent First Amend-
ment jurisprudence provides strong protection to formal associations
and recognizes the important role of freedom of association in a de-
mocratic society. 208 A separate line of cases recognizes the importance
of being able to associate without government inquiry into association
membership. 209 Specifically, the First Amendment shields membership
lists of expressive associations from government acquisition unless a
strict scrutiny hurdle is surmounted. 21° These cases, which provide lim-
its on government's ability to inquire into association membership,
must be adapted to today's new associational paradigms and new tech-
nical means to acquire information about group affiliation.
1. Free Association as an Important First Amendment Interest
Constitutional protection of freedom of association and the right
of assembly is deep-rooted. The right of assembly and to petition the
government is explicit in the First Amendment's text. 2 " The more
general right to freedom of association is implicit but longstanding and
strong.212 In 2000, in the Supreme Court's most recent case on this sub-
ject, Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, the Court recognized the crucial role
of association in democratic life and strongly upheld the right of "ex-
2" See 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1842, 1861 (West 2003 & Supp. 20 07).
207 See Fisher, supra note 11, at 629-30 (discussing this h istory).
2°a See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647-48 (2000); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees,
468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984).
209 See infra notes 227-275 and accompanying text.
21° Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1. 64 (1976); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357
U.S. 449, 460-63 (1958).
211 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
212 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 15.
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pressive associations" to determine their own membership require-
ments and policies. 213 The Court observed that:
"[I]mplicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the
First Amendment" is "a corresponding right to associate with
others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, eco-
nomic, educational, religious, and cultural ends." This right is
crucial in preventing the majority from imposing its views on
groups that would rather express other, perhaps unpopular,
ideas. 214
The Court's definition of an "expressive association" deserving
protection is broad: "[A] ssociations do not have to associate for the
`purpose' of disseminating a certain message in order to be entitled to
the protections of the First Amendment. An association must merely
engage in expressive activity that could be impaired in order to be enti-
tled to protection."215 In Dale, freedom of association trumped impor-
tant state interests in addressing discrimination against gays despite the
fact that the Boy Scouts' evidence that it had associated to express a
position on homosexuality was quite weak.216 Indeed, the Court was
willing to "accept the Boy Scouts' assertion [that it did not want to
promote homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior] " and
opined that it "need not inquire further to determine the nature of the
Boy Scouts' expression with respect to homosexuality," considering evi-
dence of the group's position on homosexuality only as "instructive, if
• only on the question of the sincerity of the professed beliefs."217 The
Court not only "give[s] deference to an association's assertions regard-
ing the nature of its expression, [but] ... also give [s] deference to an
association's view of what would impair its expression." 218
Once an association meets this deferential standard for asserting
that its rights to expressive association would be impaired by a particu-
lar government action, the government action is allowed only if it is
"adopted to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppres-
sion of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly less
213 530 U.S. at 647-48.
214 Id. (quoting and citing Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622, for the proposition that "protection
of the right to expressive association is 'especially important in preserving political and
cultural diversity and in shielding dissident expression from suppression by the majority").
213 Id. at 655.
216 See id. at 650-53,659.
Id, at 651.
218 Dale, 530 U.S. at 653.
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restrictive of associational freedoins." 20 In the Dale case, the Court
found that New Jersey's interest in undermining discrimination against
homosexuals was not a sufficiently compelling interest to justify requir-
ing the Boy Scouts to retain an openly homosexual troop leader. 22°
Whatever one thinks of the result in this particular case (and it invoked
strong dissent), 221 the point for our purposes is this: expressive associa-
tion, broadly defined, is afforded the highest protection under the First
Amendment.222 Government impositions on freedom of association
must meet the standards of strict scrutiny.223 Courts must defer to an
association's view of what would impair its expressive activities.224 There
is no reason for freedom of association rights to be checked at the
doorway to cyberspace. •
It is not immediately clear how the strong protection of expressive
association evident in Dale should be applied to less traditional organi-
zations. Emergent associations may not have well-defined "positions" on
issues, or a well-defined hierarchy, or even a well-defined membership
that can determine who can speak for the group and assert the group's
rights. Moreover, relational surveillance does not directly regulate the
messages that groups can express but merely attempts to determine
who is associated with whom. Nonetheless, relational surveillance im-
plicates the same important First Amendment interests in protecting
the "right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of .
ends" and "preventing the majority from imposing its views on groups
that would rather express other, perhaps unpopular, ideas" recognized
by the Court in Dale.225 The fact that an organization uses email and
other forms of digital communications should not be allowed to vitiate
its members' associational rights, particularly where some of this com-
munication involves core political association.
As discussed above, relational surveillance impairs expressive ac-
tivities not directly through regulation, but indirectly through deter-
rence. 226 The burdens imposed by relational surveillance in the form
219 Id. at 648 (citing Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623).
m See id. at 659-61.
"I Id. at 696 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The only apparent explanation for the major-
ity's holding, then, is that homosexuals are simply so different from the rest of society that
their presence alone—unlike any other individual's—should be singled out for special
First Amendment treatment.").
222 Sec id at 647-48 (majority opinion).
223 Dale, 530 U.S. at 648; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
224 Dale, 530 U.S. at 653.
"5 Id. at 647-48.
226 See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
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of network analysis are of at least three types: chilling of protected
association by revealing its existence, structure, and membership;
chilling of protected association because of the potential for network
analysis to mistake legitimate association for illegitimate association;
and harms to self-determination and chilling of exploratory associa-
tions because of the potential for network analysis to treat individuals
as "members" of a group with which they did not want to associate
themselves. These are the types of harms traditionally associated with
a line of freedom of association cases dealing with government re-
quests for association membership lists.
2. First Amendment Protection of Membership Lists
In a series of cases beginning in the 1950s, the Supreme Court
recognized that a government-mandated disclosure of group member-
ship could be an unconstitutional infringement on the right of associa-
tion.227 In 1958, in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, the Court first de-
termined that the NAACP had standing to assert the associational
rights of its members because "to require that [the right of association]
be claimed by the members themselves would result in nullification of
the right at the very moment of its assertion." 228 The Court went on to
note the importance of freedom of association:
Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view,
particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by
group association, as this Court has more than once recog-
nized by remarking upon the close nexus between the free-
doms of speech and assembly. It is . beyond debate that free-
dom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs
and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the "liberty" assured by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
embraces freedom of speech. Of course, it is immaterial
whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by association per-
tain to political, economic, religious or cultural matters, and
state action which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to as-
sociate is subject to the closest scrutiny. 229
22T
	
Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U.S. 87,91 (1982);
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64; NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. at 460-61.
228 357 U.S. at 459.
229 Id. at 460-61 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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The Court also noted the potential for state actions to have the unin-
tended effect of curtailing freedom of association: "In the domain of
these indispensable liberties, whether of speech, press, or association,
the decisions of this Court recognize that abridgement of such rights,
even though unintended, may inevitably follow from varied forms of
governmental action."2" It also "recognized the vital relationship be-
tween freedom to associate and privacy in one's associations."231 In-
deed, the Court noted that u[i]miolability of privacy in group associa-
tion may in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of
freedom of association, particularly where a group espouses dissident
beliefs."232 Finding the state's interest in requiring production of a
membership list insufficient to justify the potential intrusion on pro-
tected association, the Court struck down an Alabama statute requiring
disclosure. 233
The right to freedom of association is not absolute, of course, and
in later cases courts have addressed the limitations of the right to avoid
disclosing the identities of members of a group.234 The most widely
cited case in this regard, the Supreme Court's 1972 decision in Laird v.
Tatum, deals not with membership lists per se, but with a program of
Army surveillance of political activity that involved attending demon-
strations and group meetings. 235 The surveilled activity was undeniably
protected by the First Amendment, but the Court nonetheless denied
relief. 236 The question presented by the case was one of standing:
[Whether the jurisdiction of a federal court may be invoked by
a complainant who alleges that the exercise of his First
Amendment rights is being chilled by the mere existence, with-
out more, of a governmental investigative and data-gathering ac-
tivity that is alleged to be broader in scope than is reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of a valid governmental pur-
pose .237
The Court noted that it was "significant that the principal sources of
information [gathered by the surveillance program] were the news
2" Id. at 461.
2.31 Id. at 462.
232 Id.
255 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. at 966.
234 See, e.g., Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1,10,13-14 (1972).
235 See id. at 2.
23 e Id. at 13-19.
237 Id. at 10.
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media and publications in general circulation."2" The Court also noted
that
some of the information came from Army Intelligence agents
who attended meetings that were open to the public and who
wrote field reports describing the meetings, giving such data
as the name of the sponsoring organization, the identity of
speakers, the approximate number of persons in attendance,
and an indication of whether any disorder occurred. 239
On these facts, the Court denied relief based on lack of standing, con-
cluding that "ia]llegations of a subjective 'chill' are not an adequate
substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of
specific future harm; 'the federal courts established pursuant to Article
III of the Constitution do not render advisory opinions.'"240
Several points must be made about Laird's significance for present-
day questions of relational surveillance. First, it is important to note
that the Court's decision was based on lack of standing; thus, the ulti-
mate question of whether the Army's surveillance program violated the
First Amendment was never answered. 241 The Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia later noted this distinction in 1975, in White v. Davis, where it
remanded for a hearing on the merits a case based on allegations of
police undercover surveillance of activities of people affiliated with a
university. 242 Laird was distinguished because standing in the case arose
under California's provision for taxpayer suits. 243 Second, in determin-
ing the standing issue in Laird, the Court described its holding as "nar-
row" and found it "significant" that most of the information involved in
the surveillance was publicly available from other sources. 244 In other
words, the "mere existence" of the surveillance involved in Laird was
truly "mere" as the Court saw it, and the harm alleged did not stern
from the disclosure of individuals' membership in particular associa-
tions but simply from the presence of undercover Army operatives at
238 Id, at 6.
2" Laird, 408 U.S. at 6.
24° Id. at 13-14 (quoting United Pub. Workers of Am. (CIO.) v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75,
89 (1947)).
241 See id. at 15; see also White v. Davis, 533 P.2d 222, 226-27 (Cal. 1975) •(noting that
Laird was decided on standing grounds and that the Court "never reached the question of
the constitutionality of the actual intelligence-gathering operation at issue").
242 533 P.2d at 224-27.
245 Id. at 227.
244 408 U.S. at 6, 15.
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public events.245 Even in Laird, moreover, the Court was closely divided,
with four justices dissenting. 246
With respect to the standing issue, Laird may be usefully contrasted
with the Court's 1976 decision in Buckley v. Valet), where it upheld the
compelled disclosure of certain campaign finance information, which
necessarily entailed disclosure of political associations. 247 In so doing,
the Court wasted little time in finding that the constitutional require-
ments of standing were fulfilled by the plaintiffs in the case, relying
specifically on the fact that, in NAACP v. Alabama, "[ti his Court has
held, for instance, that an organization 'may assert, on behalf of its
members, a right personal to them to be protected from compelled
disclosure ... of their affiliation.'"248 The Court made no particular in-
quiry into the level of harm anticipated by particular plaintiffs as a re-
sult of disclosure, apparently concluding that the requirement of dis-
closure itself was sufficient harm to support standing. 249
Setting aside the question of standing, we now focus on the sub-
stantive question of when the government may inquire into citizens'
protected associational activities. In Buckley, the issue most relevant for
present purposes was whether certain requirements that campaign
contributions be disclosed were an unconstitutional imposition on
freedom of association, particularly for those who contributed to mi-
nority parties and those who contributed small amounts of money. 250
The Court affirmed the importance of freedom of association in the
context of disclosure of associational membership, noting:
We long have recognized that significant encroachments on
First Amendment rights of the sort that compelled disclosure
imposes cannot be justified by a mere showing of some le-
gitimate governmental interest. Since NAACP v. Alabama we
have required that the subordinating interests of the State
must survive exacting scrutiny. We also have insisted that
there be a "relevant correlation" or "substantial relation" be-
tween the governmental interest and the information re-
quired to be disclosed. This type of scrutiny is necessary even
if any deterrent effect on the exercise of First Amendment
rights arises, not through direct government action, but in-
246 See id. at 10.
246 Id. at 1.
247 424 U.S. at 63, 84.
24B Id. at 12 n.10 (citing NAACP u Alabama, 357 U.S. at 458).
249 see id.
250 Id. at 68-69, 83.
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directly as an unintended but inevitable result of the gov-
ernment's conduct in requiring disclosure. 251
Significantly, the right to freedom of association was implicated by the
Buckley disclosure requirements even though they applied not to official
"membership" in an organization, but only to contributions to a candi-
date or political action committee.252
In Buckley, the Court went on to uphold the particular disclosure
requirements at issue in light of the compelling government interests
involved. 253 The Court recognized:
It is undoubtedly true that public disclosure of contributions
to candidates and political parties will deter some individuals
who otherwise might contribute. In some instances, disclosure
may even expose contributors to harassment or retaliation.
These are not insignificant burdens on individual rights, and
they must be weighed carefully against the interests which
Congress has sought to promote by this legislation. 254
In upholding the requirements nonetheless, the Court relied on the
fact that those challenging the requirements had conceded that the
disclosure requirements in general were the least restrictive means" of
advancing the substantial government interests in the "free functioning
of our national institutions" addressed by the legislation and chal-
lenged the requirements only as they might apply to certain minority
parties and candidates. 255
The Court also noted that the allegations of harm due to disclo-
sure were speculative and outweighed by the substantial public interest
in the disclosures mandated by the law. 255 The Court left open the pos-
sibility, however, that sufficient evidence of potential harm might lead
to a different result in future cases. 257 In particular, the Court opined
that "[t] he evidence offered need show only a reasonable probability
that the compelled disclosure of a party's contributors' names will sub-
ject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Government
officials or private parties."258 In 1982, in Brown v. Socialist Walkers '74
251 Id. at 64 (citation omitted).
2" Buckley, 424 U.S. at 65.
2" Id. at 66-67.
251 Id. at 68.
255 Id. at 66-68.
2" Id. at 71-72.
252 Buckley, 924 U.S. at 71.
258 Id. at 74.
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Campaign Committee, the Court followed up on that possibility in the
context of disclosures required by a state campaign finance law, con-
cluding that the disclosure requirements were unconstitutional where
the minor party involved presented "substantial evidence of both gov-
ernmental and private hostility toward and harassment of SWII mem-
bers and supporters."259 The Court noted that "[t] he right to privacy in
one's political associations and beliefs will yield only to a 'subordinating
interest of the State [that is] compelling,' and then only if there is a
'substantial relation between the information sought and [an] overrid-
ing and compelling state interest., "260
In considering whether compelled disclosure of association mem-
bership is permissible, the Supreme Court and lower courts following it
have emphasized the extent to which the disclosure is tailored to the
governmental objectives behind it. 261 When the required disclosure is
too broad it is unconstitutional. 262 Thus, in 1960, in Shelton u Tucker, the
Court struck down a requirement that teachers list every organization
to which they had belonged within the preceding five years, noting that
"even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial,
that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle funda-
mental personal liberties when the endcan be more narrowly
achieved. "265
In 1978, in Britt v. Superior Court, the Supreme Court of California
blocked a discovery request for disclosure of associational affiliations
where the request was overly broad. 2" The request sought informa-
tion related to the plaintiffs' involvement with "various organizations
opposed to the ... way in which the Port District operates its Air-
port."265 hi quashing the request, the court noted that the protections
of freedom of association were not limited to membership in unpopu-
lar organizations, concluding that "bin view of the sweeping scope of
the discovery order at issue, we think it clear that such order 'is likely
to pose a substantial restraint upon the exercise of First Amendment
rights.'"266 In numerous other cases, courts have struck down requests
2" 459 U.S. at 91 (citations omitted).
26° Id. at 91-92 (citations omitted).
261 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64; Britt v. Superior Court, 574 1'.2d 766, 768 (Cal. 1978).
262 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960); Britt, 574 P.2d at 777.
2" 364 U.S. at 488.
251 574 P.2d at 775, 779.
266 Id. at 769.
268 Id. at 773 (quoting White, 533 P.2d at 232).
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for disclosure of organizational membership that cut too broadly in
relation to the government interests underlying the requests. 267
In the discovery context, some courts have required an initial
showing of "some probability" of First Amendment harm before shift-
ing the burden to the requestor to establish that the requested infor-
mation goes to the "heart of the matter" and that there is no other
means for obtaining the necessary information. 268 Even those courts
recognize, however, that concrete evidence of chilling effects is not
necessary when a request is overly broad and that it is sometimes ap-
propriate to use a "common sense approach" in assuming that disclo-
sure of particular information will chill an association's First Amend-
ment rights. 269
When courts have permitted the compelled disclosure of associa-
tional membership, they have required a close connection between the
required disclosure and the governmental purpose. 27° In an early case
upholding a requirement "compelling organizations to register and to
list their members on a showing merely that they are foreign-
dominated and operate primarily to advance the objectives of the world
Communist movement," for example, the Court noted that the re-
quirement was narrowly limited to "organized groups which have been
made the instruments of a long-continued, systematic, disciplined activ-
ity directed by a foreign power and purposing to overthrow existing
government in this country."271 Similarly; in a case upholding a sub-
poena to produce a membership list of a Ku Klux Klan group, the court
noted the Klan's history of racially motivated violence and intimidation
and the close connection of the context of the subpoena, which was the
investigation of an arson in which Klan emblems were found on the
lawn of the home that was burned, to the membership disclosure.272
267 See generally Nat'l Commodity & Barter Ass'n v. Archer, 31 F.3d 1521 (10th Cir. 1994);
Fed. Election Comm'n v. Hall-Tyner Election Campaign Comm., 678 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1982);
Marshall v. Stevens People & Friends for Freedom, 669 F.2d 171 (4th Cir. 1981); Familias
Unidas v. Briscoe, 619 F.2d 391 (5th Cir. 1980); Hastings v N.E. Indep. Sch. Dist., 615 F.2d
628 (5th Cir. 1980); hal Union v. Garner, 102 F.R.D. 108 (M.D. Tenn. 1984); Pac.-Union
Club v. Superior Court, 283 Cal. Rptr. 287 (Ct. App. 1991); Crocker v. Revolutionary Com-
munist Progressive Labor Party, 533 N.E.2d 444 (III. App. Ct 1988); Lubin v. Agora, Inc., 882
A.2d 833 (Md. 2005); Tilton v Mope, 869 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. 1994); Right-Price Recreation,
LLC v. Connells Prairie Cmty. Council, 21 P.3d 1157 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
268 E.g., Snedigar v. Hoddersen, 786 P.2d 781, 786 (Wash. 1990).
262 E.g., id. at 785 (citing authority).
27° Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64; see Communist Party of the U.S. v. Subversive Activities Con-
trol Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 93 (1961).
271 Communist Party, 367 U.S. at 81-82, 105.
272
 Marshall v. Bramer, 828 F.2d 355, 358, 360 (6th Cir. 1987).
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Because of the important First Amendment rights implicated by
disclosure of associational ties, the fact that the requested associational
information is in third party hands does not remove the constitutional
protection.273 In 1983, in In re Fiat National Bank, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit specifically distinguished the Fourth
Amendment holding in Miller regarding financial records in third party
hands "because the constitutionally protected right, freedom to associ-
ate freely and anonymously, will be chilled equally whether the associa-
tional information is compelled from the organization itself or from
third parties."274 This argument is particularly strong in today's society
where effective communication and association essentially requires the
use of digital technology, which inevitably leaves records in third party
hands. Whether or not these records are entitled to a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment, they should not be
available for the government to use to reconstruct protected associa-
tional membership lists.
The above cases make clear that, no matter how compelling the
government interest, a broad-based request for lists of association
membership, whether directed to an individual or to a third party, is
unconstitutional unless the request is restricted to organizations di-
rectly implicated in the governmental purpose and obtaining the
membership list is necessary to effectuating that purpose. 275
273 See In re First Nat'l Bank, Engelwood, Colo., 701 F.2d 115,117-18 (10th Cir. 1983).
274 Id.
275 There is another potential source of constitutional limits on relational surveillance
that is beyond the scope of the present Article. Due process may limit the extent to which,
and purposes for which, governments may amass databases of persona! information. Sec
Slobogin, Government Data Mining, supra note 6, at 10. Though the Supreme Court has yet
to strike down a government program on this basis, the Court has recognized the potential
danger inherent in government aggregations of private data:
We are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast
amounts of personal information in computerized data banks or other massive
government files. The collection of taxes, the distribution of welfare and social
security benefits, the supervision of public health, the direction of our Armed
Forces, and the enforcement of the criminal laws all require the orderly preser-
vation of great quantities of information, much of which is personal in charac-
ter and potentially embarrassing or harmful if disclosed. The right to collect
and use such data for public purposes is typically accompanied by a concomi-
tant statutory or regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures. Recogniiing
that in some circumstances that duty arguably has its roots in the Constitution,
nevertheless New York's statutory scheme, and its implementing administrative
procedures, evidence a proper concern with, and protection of, the individual's
interest in privacy. We therefore need not, and do not, decide any question
which might be presented by the unwarranted disclosure of accumulated pri-
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IV. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION FOR A NETWORKED SOCIETY
Extensive government relational surveillance using network analy-
sis data mining techniques poses a serious threat to liberty because of
its potential to chill unpopular, yet legitimate, association, and also be-
cause of the chilling of legitimate association caused by possibly incor-
rect assessment of both legitimate and illegitimate associational mem-
bership. The potential for similar "guilt by association" to chill protected
association is quite evident in the response to increased surveillance
and targeting of Muslims and Arabs following the September 11, 2001
tragedy. 276
 The danger is heightened in today's world wherein an in-
creasing amount of communication is intermediated by third party ser-
vice providers and more and more democratically significant associa-
tion, assembly, and petition of the government is informal, emergent,
and technologically mediated. 277 It is also clear that in this age of con-
cern with international terrorism there will be growing pressure to 'ap-
ply network analysis techniques to root out terrorist and criminal activ-
ity, either because there is real potential for effective law enforcement
and counterterrorism application or because of the inevitable lure of
the chimerical "technological fix."
The First Amendment must supplement the Fourth Amendment
and its related statutory scheme in regulating relational surveillance.
The threat to freedom of association, especially with respect to new and
empowering forms of association, is profound. Because the First
Amendment is not grounded primarily in privacy and because it pro-
tects group membership data even when it is in third party hands, it
plays a necessary part in limiting relational surveillance. 278
The extension of First Amendment doctrine to relational surveil-
lance is particularly appropriate because the First Amendment right to
freedom of association has already been applied to regulate govern-
ment access to associational information and that doctrine is instructive
vane data—whether intentional or unintentional—or by a system that did not
contain comparable security provisions.
Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605-06 (footnote omitted).
Traffic data is certainly not the kind of paradigmatically intimate information involved
in Whalen a Roe. See id. Relational surveillance, however, has the potential to expose inti-
mate associations and expressive associations which might be "potentially embarrassing or
harmful if disclosed" so perhaps there is a cognizable due process issue. See id. Because the
application of the First Amendment seems much more straightforward, I focus on it here.
276 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
277 See US C.ONS•. amend I; supra notes 31 -36 and accompanying text.
278 See In re First Nat'l Bank, Engelwood, Colo., 701 F.2d 115,117-18 (10th Cir. 1983).
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in considering how to apply freedom of association doctrine to rela-
tional surveillance. 279 There is little precedent, however, in the First
Amendment context for adapting to new technologies. Fourth Amend-
ment doctrine, on the other hand, has repeatedly been adapted to
evolving technological contexts. 280 Although the Fourth Amendment is
not targeted to protect against relational surveillance, Fourth Amend-
ment precedent is instructive as to how a First Amendment doctrine
developed in the context of traditional associations should be adapted
in light of technological evolution affecting associational behavior and
surveillance methods. When adapted appropriately, the First Amend-
ment's freedom of association guarantees place limits on relational sur-
veillance that are not adequately reflected in current statutory or case
law.
A. The First Amendment Must Be a Primary Source of Protection. Against
Overreaching Relational Surveillance
As the discussion in Part 1111.A demonstrates, present-day Fourth
Amendment doctrine is not easily extended to cover relational surveil-
lance using traffic data. 281 Because of the case law's crabbed approach
to "reasonable expectations of privacy," which are destroyed by disclo-
sure to third party intermediaries, and surveillance law's emphasis on
protecting content and guarding against real-time interception, there
are difficult arguments to be made in bringing network analysis of traf-
fic data within the ambit of the Fourth Amendment's protections.
One way to deal with this conundrum might be to view the Fourth
Amendment through a special First Amendment lens in cases implicat-
ing expressive activity. The extent to which and the way in which the
First and Fourth Amendments combine to regulate government activity
is unclear, as recently discussed by Professor Daniel Solove, who argues
generally that the First Amendment has a role to play in regulating sur-
veillance. 282 A general framework for analyzing the constitutionality of
government acquisition of information about First Amendment activity
has not yet been established, but freedom of speech concerns do un-
derlie certain restrictions courts have placed on government acquisi-
tion of information. 283 For example, the distinction between content of
279 See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
299 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29-30 (2001) (thermal imaging device); Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967) (electronic listening and recording device).
291 See supra notes 121-170 and accompanying text.
292 See Solove, supra note 9, at 128-33.
283 Id. at 157-61, 176-77.
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communications and traffic data is arguably undergirded by First
Amendment concerns. Moreover, the First Amendment dictates that
Fourth Amendment procedures, including the standard for particular-
ity of warrants, must be applied with "scrupulous exactitude" when seiz-
ing books and other First Amendment-protected materials. 284 As Solove
points out, however, the case law does not resolve the question of what
to do when government information gathering has First Amendment
implications yet falls outside of the Fourth Amendment because there
is no "reasonable expectation of privacy" in the information under pre-
sent Fourth Amendment doctrine. 266
As part of a general attack on current Fourth Amendment doc-
trine, Professor Akhil Amax has argued that the permissibility of a
search under the Fourth Amendment should be determined by a gen-
eral inquiry into reasonableness and that the First Amendment signifi-
cance of the information acquired should inform the reasonableness of
a search under the Fourth Amendment. 286 Solove suggests that whether
a search "implicates" the First Amendment should be an alternative to
the "reasonable expectation of privacy" threshold under current
Fourth Amendment doctrine. 281 As another alternative, Solove suggests
that the First Amendment should "provide an independent source of
criminal procedure" under a general framework involving a two-part
inquiry into whether the activity falls within the boundaries of the First
Amendment and whether the government information gathering has a
chilling effect upon the First Amendment activity. 288
The awkward fit between freedom of association's interest in pro-
tecting a varied and lively civic square—and hence in protecting un-
popular and fringe associations—and the Fourth Amendment's "rea-
sonable expectations of privacy" suggests that merely using the First
Amendment as a trigger or booster for Fourth Amendment scrutiny
will not be sufficient to serve the distinctive interests in freedom of as-
sociation implicated by relational surveillance. A direct resort to the
First Amendment, in addition to any appropriate Fourth Amendment
analysis, is needed. Moreover, in this specific context, there is no need
to create a framework for applying the First Amendment to govern-
284 Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 597, 569 (1978); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476,
485 (1965).
285 Solove, supra note 9, at 132.
288 Akhil Reed Arnar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV, 757, 804-06
(1994).
z67 Solove, supra note 9, at 132.
486 Id.
2008]	 Relational Surveillance & the First Amendment	 797
ment acquisition of information out of whole cloth. Existing case law
tells us much about how to evaluate the constitutional permissibility of
government attempts to obtain associational information. 299 Freedom
of association doctrine tells us that government inquiry into member-
ship in expressive associations must be driven by a compelling govern-
ment interest and that there must be a substantial relation between the
specific disclosure and that interest. 299 Where the inquiry is too broad,
even where the associations involved are not particularly unpopular or
disfavored, courts can employ a "common sense" presumption that
there will be an impermissible burden upon freedom of association. 291
In what follows, this Article therefore considers how the First. Amend-
ment, as interpreted in light of modern technology, might serve as an
independent source of limitations on relational surveillance.
B. Principles for Technological Adaptation Derived from
Fourth Amendment Law
Although the prospects for direct Fourth Amendment protection
from relational surveillance seem rather bleak at this point, the ways in
which more traditional Fourth Amendment doctrine has been adapted
to deal with advancing technology provide clues about how to adapt
freedom of association protection in the face of technological advance.
Fourth Amendment doctrine has often focused on how to adapt consti-
tutional protections to new technological realities. 292 In this respect,
freedom of association doctrine lags behind. Case law to date essentially
deals exclusively with membership lists (or lists of contributors) com-
piled by formal, traditional organizations and obtained directly from
those organizations, 293 What should be done when technology shifts the
locus of important associational activity away from traditional organiza-
tions and the means of data acquisition away from traditional requests
for documents and lists? The ways in which Fourth Amendment doc-
trine has adapted to technological change provide principles that can
inform the extension of freedom of association doctrine to new techno-
logical circumstances.
999 See supra notes 227-275 and accompanying text.
29° Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960);
Britt v. Superior Court, 574 P.2d 766, 768, 777 (Cal. 1978).
291 SceSnedigar v. lloddersen, 786 P.2d 781, 785 (Wash. 1990).
rn See, e.g., Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29-30 (thermal imaging device); Katz, 389 U.S. at 348
(electronic listening and recording device).
283 See supra notes 227-275 and accompanying text.
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Three specific principles are relevant here: First, surveillance doc-
trine must be responsive to technological change that transforms the
situs of private communication. Second, surveillance doctrine must
recognize that new means of analyzing available data change the consti-
tutional balance. Finally, surveillance doctrine must be sensitive to the
extent to which a particular search technology discriminates between
innocent and illegal behavior.
1. Surveillance Doctrine Must Respond to Destabilizing Technical
Change that Transforms the Situs of Private Communication
The seminal case for modern Fourth Amendment law is Katz v.
United Stales, decided by the Supreme Court in 1967. 294 In Katz, the
Court considered the constitutionality of -a search that involved attach-
ing an electronic listening device to the outside of a telephone booth
and listening to the occupant's end of telephone calls. 295 In evaluating
the Fourth Amendment claim, the Court made its now famous state-
ment that
the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protec-
tion. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected. 296
The Court rejected an analysis based on the extent to which the surveil-
lance method intruded upon a "constitutionally protected area." 297 In-
stead, the Court relied on .the phone booth occupant's intent to ex-
clude the "uninvited ear" and stated that "[do read the Constitution
more narrowly is to ignore the vital role that the public telephone has
come to play in private communication." 298 The Court's holding in Katz
recognized the need for surveillance doctrine to adapt to technology-
driven social change. Given that individuals increasingly held private
conversations by telephone and that telephone booths were designed
to facilitate such private conversations away from the home, the Court
concluded that it would be unreasonable to permit government surveil-
lance of such conversations without a warrant. 299
294 See generally 389 U.S. 347.
296 Id. at 348.
296 Id. at 351 (citations omitted).
297 Id.
298 Id. at 352.
298 Katz, 3B9 U.S. at 352.
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Just as the telephone had become such an indispensable means
of communication at the time of the Katz decision, the Internet and
other forms of digital communication have taken on a critical com-
munication role in today's society. 300 The locus of critical associational
activity has moved. Surveillance law must adapt so that freedom of
association remains protected under these new social and technologi-
cal circumstances. The protection of association mediated by digital
technology is just as important as the protection of traditional organi-
zations, and relational surveillance has the same potential to suppress
expressive association as direct requests for membership lists.
2. Surveillance Doctrine Must Recognize that New Means of Analysis
of Available Data Can Change the Constitutional Balance
In 2001, in Kylla v. United States, the Supreme Court dealt not with
a change in the technology of constitutionally protected activity, but
with a change in the technology of surveillance, which permitted what
was effectively a search of a home using data acquired without ever
going onto the premises."' The Court held that the development of
thermal imaging technology required an expansion of the scope of
Fourth Amendment coverage such that
obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information re-
garding the interior of the home that could not otherwise
have been obtained without physical "intrusion into a consti-
tutionally protected area," constitutes a search—at least where
(as here) the technology in question is not in general public
use. This assures preservation of that degree of privacy against
government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was
adopted."2
The Court specifically acknowledged that It] he question we confront
today is what limits there are upon this power of technology to shrink
the realm of guaranteed privacy."'"
This emphasis on the need to reevaluate the scope of constitu-
tional protection in light of advancing technology is directly relevant to
considering whether the Constitution protects against data mining and
network analysis technology. Like the thermal imager in Kyllo, data
'co See id.
533 U.S. at 29-30.
" Id. at 34 (citations omitted).
903 Id.
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mining takes data that is already accessible to law enforcement (the
heat radiating from the house was in "plain view") and transforms it
into new knowledge that would not otherwise be available by constitu-
tional means. 304 In the case of relational surveillance of traffic data,
network analysis produces knowledge which, like the thermal image in
Kyllo, is embedded in the data, yet not available without applying the
technology. 305 The Court in Kyllo specifically rejected the proposition
that an investigating tool that was a means of processing data rather
than collecting it could not constitute a search. 306
 The dissent empha-
sized the collection of the data about heat emanating from a dwelling,
analogizing it to the smell of smoke and arguing that it was ridiculous
to provide protection for data that is so obviously available in "plain
view."307 In so doing, the dissent did not incorporate data analysis into
its definition of the search, arguing that the production of a thermal
image was merely an "inference" from data in plain view. 308 The Court
rejected this argument, holding that the fact that an "inference" was
involved did not insulate an investigative technique from Fourth
Amendment reviews"
Advances in surveillance technology are of two types: finding ways
to obtain more data and finding ways to obtain more information from
available data. The recognition that a technology for analyzing available
data can tip the constitutional balance is a critical bulwark against the
potential for advancing technology to undermine constitutional norms.
3. Surveillance Doctrine Must Be Sensitive to the Extent to Which a
Particular Search Technology Discriminates Between Innocent and
Illegal Behavior
Notwithstanding Kyllo's dictates about the application of techno-
logical means of investigation, there are technological means not in
"general public use," the use of which do not constitute a Fourth
Amendment search."' In 2005, in Illinois v. Caballes, the Court consid-
ered the constitutionality of a suspicionless "dog sniff" for illegal drugs
904 see id.
301 See id.
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35-36.
307 Id. at 42-44 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
3" See id, at 41.
309 Id. at 36 (majority opinion).
31° Compare Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409-10 (2005) (drug sniff by police dog
not a search), with Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (thermal imaging is a search).
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during a routine traffic stop. 311 The Court held categorically that the
"dog sniff" did not constitute a search because "governmental conduct
that only reveals the possession of contraband 'compromises no legiti-
mate privacy interest.'"312 The Court contrasted the "dog sniff" with the
thermal imaging in Kyllo, noting that "[c)ritical to [the Kyllo) decision
was the fact that the device was capable of detecting lawful activity."s 13
Regardless of whether the Court was correct in assuming that dog sniffs
are sensitive only to the presence of contraband (an assumption
strongly disputed by justice Souter in dissent), 3 " the important point
remains: the intrusiveness of a particular form of technological surveil-
lance depends on the extent to which it exposes both legitimate and
illegitimate activity and its accuracy in distinguishing the two. 315
C. Adapting First Amendment Freedom of Association to New Technologies
1. Establishing a Freedom of Association Framework for Evaluating
Relational Surveillance
The three principles identified from the path that Fourth
Amendment doctrine has trod in adapting to technological change can
be helpful in thinking about how to update First Ainendment doctrine
in the context of modern day relational surveillance. First, just as tech-
nological advances expanded the situs of private life to include tele-
phone booths, communications technology developments have af-
fected the situs of associational life. 316 Traditional, formal associations
with hierarchical means of promulgating policy positions and well-
defined memberships persist, but an increasingly large proportion of
socially significant expressive association takes place in informal, emer-
gent groups, the membership of which may not be known to anyone.
Traditionally, freedom of association protections have been extended
only to intimate associations and to associations engaged in expressive
activities, though those expressive activities are very broadly defined. 317
m I See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407; see also United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 697 (1983).
512 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408 (citations omitted).
3" Id. at 409.
Ill Id. at 410-13 (Souter, J., dissenting).
313 See id. at 409-10 (majority opinion).
316 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
317 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 655 (2000) ("[A]ssociations do not have to
associate for the 'purpose' of disseminating a certain message in order to be entitled to the
protections of the First Amendment_ An association must merely engage in expressive
activity that could be impaired in order to be entitled to protection.").
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Under traditional circumstances, it was possible to determine whether
an association was engaged in expressive activities before determining
whether to enforce a request for disclosure of a membership list.sis Be-
cause network analysis discloses membership simultaneously with iden-
tifying associations, waiting until an association is identified as "expres-
sive" in nature before determining whether it is protected from
disclosure of its membership is no longer possible.
The inquiry therefore must focus not on whether a specific asso-
ciation is "expressive," but on the likelihood that a particular instance
of relational surveillance will disclose membership in expressive asso-
ciations. Such an approach is grounded in the well-established inquiry
into First Amendment statutory overbreadth—whether "rights of as-
sociation were ensnared in statutes which, by their broad sweep,
might result in burdening innocent associations."319 Assessment of the
likelihood of burdening expressive association must be made in light
of the very broad definition of expressive association set forth by the
Supreme Court in 2000, ill Boy Scouts of America u Dale. 320 Just as courts
sometimes make a common sense assumption that a broad disclosure
of associational memberships will result in a reasonable probability of
chilling of protected association, 321 courts should assume that a social
network analysis of traffic data will reveal the membership and struc-
ture of expressive associations, among others, unless the analysis pro-
cedure is sufficiently narrowly targeted.
Second, even when some data has already been disclosed or is in
third party hands, First Amendment protections must be extended to
government use of sophisticated technological means, such as network
analysis algorithms, which evade traditional prohibitions on compelling
disclosure of associational information yet produce equivalently intru-
sive information. The use of sophisticated network analysis algorithms
to uncover associations is not like the surveillance upheld by the Court
in 1971, in Laird v. Tatum, which focused on publicly available informa-
tion and attendance at meetings open to the public.322 The associa-
tional information derived from network analysis of traffic data is not
SIB See id. at 656.
319 Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973) (citing United States v. Robel, 389
U.S, 258 (1967); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Aptheker v. Sec'y of State,
378 U.S. 500 (1964); Shelton, 364 U.S. 479); see also Lynch, supra note 9, at 277-78 (discussing
the applicability of First Amendment overbreadth doctrine in the surveillance context); So-
love, supra note 9, at 158-59.
52° See 530 U.S. at 655.
921 See Snedigar, 786 P.2d at 785.
522 See408 U.S. 1, 6 (1971).
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apparent in the raw data. Although the associational information may
be implicit in available traffic data, just as thermal images are implicit
in the measurement of thermal emissions from a home, the use of net-
work analysis algorithms is an additional, constitutionally cognizable
intrusion.321 The correlations uncovered by network analysis are quite
unlike the simple lists of numbers called or financial transactions asso-
ciated with a particular account involved in Smith v. Maryland or United
States v. Millet324 Communications intermediaries would not be able to
"see" these implicit structures in the ordinary course of business while
using traffic data either to transmit communications or in conjunction
with administrative functions such as billing. Indeed, the pseudony-
mous and nonhierarchical nature of emergent association means that
there may be no one—not even the participants in the association
themselves—who has a list of participants in a particular emergent as-
sociation until a network analysis is performed.
Third, the extent to which surveillance intrudes upon constitu-
tionally protected freedoms depends heavily on a specific program's
ability to distinguish legal from illegal behavior. 325 This means that the
extent to which a particular instance or program of relational surveil-
lance burdens protected association depends on the likelihood that
legitimate expressive associations will be exposed to government scru-
tiny. That likelihood depends both on the accuracy of the technology
used to distinguish suspect from legitimate associations and on the
potential for abuse of the technology and relevant data by those with
access to it. Whether a network analysis technology intrudes on pro-
tected freedom of association should be judged at the outset by its
ability to distinguish those associations that are relevant to the com-
pelling government interest that motivates the analysis from other
associations and to refrain from revealing the membership of associa-
tions that are not closely related to the government purposes at issue.
It should also be judged by its susceptibility to misuse as a means to
target unpopular organizations or political opponents. When a par-
ticular technique is likely to disclose a significant amount of protected
activity or is inaccurate in its assessment of traffic data, there is a simi-
larly significant likelihood of burdening freedom of association.
In sum, the questions to pose in evaluating the constitutionality of
relational surveillance based on computerized network analysis of traffic
325 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35-37.
324 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 736 n.1 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S.
435, 436 (1975).
345 See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408-10.
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data should be these: Does the surveillance serve a legitimate and com-
pelling government interest? Is the analysis sufficiently accurate and
narrowly tailored to that interest in light of the extent to which it is likely
to expose protected expressive and intimate associations? The next Sec-
tion discusses how particular forms of relational surveillance implicate
the First Amendment's freedom of association requirements." 6 How to
implement this standard in a practical manner is, of course, the rub.
This Article has focused primarily on identifying the issue with the hope
that the Constitution's mandate to protect expressive association even in
a networked world will take a more prominent place in the ongoing de-
bate about surveillance regulation. The next Section attempts to sketch
out how these requirements might be enforced.
2. Applying the Freedom of Association Framework to Network
Analysis
The extent to which network analysis implicates the right to free-
dom of association depends on the type of analysis. The following Sub-
sections explain how freedom of association is likely to be implicated in
the three types of analysis identified in Part II. 327
 Of course, a particular
surveillance program may overlap these paradigmatic examples.
a. Analysis of Known. Social Networks
Where social network analysis is used to understand relationships
between a group of already-identified individuals, the freedom of asso-
ciation question depends almost entirely on how and why the individu-
als were identified. Professor Linda Fisher has argued, in the more
general context of real world political surveillance and expressive asso-
ciation, that the First Amendment would be satisfied by a threshold of
reasonable suspicion that a group is involved in criminal activity and by
a requirement that the least restrictive means of investigation be
used. 328 Perhaps some similar threshold would be appropriate in the
context of employment of social network analysis to investigate the
structure of a known group. It would be inappropriate, for example, for
the government to obtain call traffic records of the members of a le-
gitimate political or religious group so as to engage in an investigation
of its leadership structure. Such an analysis serves no legitimate and
326 See Solove, supra note 9, at 159-76 (offering a general proposal about how to im-
plement First Amendment limitations on surveillance).
327 See supra notes 77-116 and accompanying text.
323 See Fisher, supra note 11, at 627-28.
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compelling government interest and implicates freedom of association
concerns in much the same way as, though perhaps to a lesser extent
than, a compelled disclosure of a membership list. 329
 On the other
hand, there might be legitimate reasons (including, for example, re-
search) for government to conduct a similar network analysis of an ex-
pressive association using publicly available information about relation-
ships. Although one can imagine unsavory government uses of social
network analysis of known groups using publicly available data, it is
hard to argue that the potential for such an analysis would have a seri-
ous chilling effect on protected association.
Just as government agents could presumably piece together a list
of group members from publicly available sources without running
afoul of freedom of association strictures, it would seem that the free-
dom of association threshold for uses of social network analysis to study
known groups should lie at government acquisition of nonpublic
communications records from communication intermediaries. Some
showing of likelihood that the group is engaged in criminal or terrorist
activities should be required for such acquisition in order to demon-
strate the requisite government interest in the analysis. Because the in-
trusion on expressive association is relatively minimal given that group
members have already been identified, the reasonable suspicion
threshold suggested by Fisher seems appropriate here as wel1. 339
b. Targeted Link Analysis
As described in Part II, targeted link analysis can be employed to
investigate the associations surrounding a particular individual or
group of individuals who have aroused suspicion in some other way. 33 I
Essentially, a targeted link analysis can produce information regard-
ing the target individual equivalent to the list of group memberships
required by the statute struck down by the Supreme Court in 1960, in
329 See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. at 460-62.
554 See Fisher, supra note 11, at 627-28. For a general argument that under the Fourth
Amendment the threshold for search should be on a sliding scale based on the level of intru-
sion, see Slobogin, Len Not Bury Terry, supra note 126, at 1066-70. The First Amendment
requires a similar tailoring of the level of impact on the right to freedom of association to the
extent to which the surveillance furthers a compelling government interest. See Dale, 530 U.S.
at 648; Communist Party of the U.S. v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1,93 (1961)
(distinguishing prior case law based on the magnitude of the governmental interest at stake
in the case and the extent to which the registration and disclosure provisions were tailored to
serve that interest).
331 See supra notes 82-93 and accompanying text.
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Shelton v. Tucker: 332 Like such an indiscriminate request for informa-
tion about group memberships, a targeted link analysis is very likely to
expose a wide range of expressive and intimate associations to gov-
ernment scrutiny. Thus, such an analysis runs afoul of the First
Amendment unless it is properly justified and narrowly tailored. 333
Current surveillance regulation does not adequately account for
the imposition on freedom of association which targeted link analysis
entails. As discussed above, the Supreme Court has held, based on the
third party doctrine, that the Fourth Amendment does not protect lists
of phone numbers called by individuals. 334 Lower courts have extended
this holding to similar electronic traffic data used by LSPs. 333 Obtaining
communications traffic data in real time is currently regulated by "pen
register" statutes, which permit traffic surveillance as long as the gov-
ernment certifies that "the information likely to be obtained ... is rele-
vant to an ongoing criminal investigation." 336 Obtaining stored traffic
data currently requires a similar, or even lesser, showing. 337
The First Amendment, however, mandates a higher threshold for
targeted link analysis.338 A link analysis can be the equivalent of disclos-
ing a large fraction of an individual's group affiliations, much as was
demanded of teachers by the statute struck down in Shelton.539 Such a
wide-ranging inquiry into an individual's associations is precluded
unless First Amendment standards are met. 340 Moreover, because link
analysis employs second and even higher order connections (i.e. the
links between the central individual's associates, the links between their
associates, and so forth) to categorize an individual's associates into
groups and to determine such things as the structure of a group or a
particular individual's role in the group, it is not only more intrusive to
the central individual than a mere list of direct links or numbers dialed,
but also intrudes into the associations of untargeted individuals.
332 See Shelton, 364 U.S. at 487-88.
333 See id.
338 Smith, 442 U.S. at 745-46.
3" United States v. Forrester, 500 F.3d 500, 509-10 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v.
Hambrick, No. 99-4793, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 18665, at *11-12 (9th Cir. Aug. 3, 2000).
3" 18 U.S.C. § 3122 (2000).
337 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2703 (West 2000 & Stipp. 2007) (requiring stored data to be "rele-
vant and material to an ongoing investigation'); 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861 (West 2003 & Supp.
2007) (requiring a showing that the stored data is "relevant to an authorized investigation
to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities").
358
 See Shelton, 364 U.S. at 988.
338 Id.
348 Id.
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The First Amendment does not call for a categorical ban on tar-
geted link analysis, but rather for its judicious use. The fact that link
analysis begins with specific identified individuals means that the gov-
ernment frequently may be able to meet the First Amendment's re-
quirements of narrow tailoring to a compelling government interest, at
least with respect to the associations of the target individual. 341 If there
is probable cause to believe that the target individual has committed a
crime or is engaged in terrorist activity, a link analysis is certainly ap-
propriate. The broad sweep of such an analysis, however, means that a
mere relevance standard for obtaining the necessary traffic data cannot
provide the narrow tailoring required by strict scrutiny either for the
central individual or for the other individuals caught up in the web of
associational links.
How should targeted link analysis be regulated so as to comport
with the First Amendment's strictures? As a practical matter there must
be a workable framework within which law enforcement officials can
operate. Though it would be possible to develop a separate First
Amendment standard to govern acquisition of traffic data for link
analysis, it may be sufficient to import existing standards used in the
Fourth Amendment context, at least as a baseline. 342 Such an approach,
if implemented so as to accord with First Amendment requirements,
would have many practical advantages because it would not require law
enforcement officers to learn an entirely new lexicon of standards.
In the context of targeted link analysis, the greatest potential
burden on protected association would fall on the target individual,
because the goal of the analysis would be to get a complete picture of
that individual's associations. As in Shelton, such a burden cannot be
justified without a close relationship between that individual's associa-
tions and a compelling government interest such as fighting serious
crime or thwarting terrorism. 343 Before undertaking that kind of an
analysis, law enforcement officials should be required to demonstrate
such a relationship. One way to ensure such a substantial relationship
with respect to the target individual would be to require a warrant
based on probable cause either that the individual who is the focus of
a link analysis has committed a crime to which his or her associations
are relevant or that he or she is involved in a terrorist or criminal en-
terprise. To ensure a substantial relationship between the inquiry into
sit See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64; NAACP o. Alabama, 357 U.S. at 460-63; Britt, 579 P.2d at
768.
342 See Solove, supra note 9, at 161-62.
3'3 See 364 U.S. at 488.
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associations and a compelling government interest, the crime in-
volved should also be of a sufficient degree of seriousness.
A more difficult question is what standard to require for obtain-
ing the communications traffic records of those associated with an
individual who is the focus of a link analysis. Network analysis uses
these second and higher order links to determine the nature of the
target individual's associations with more accuracy. For example, a
suspected terrorist may communicate with three groups of people—
his family, a church group, and a terrorist organization. There may be
no way to distinguish the members of these groups based on the tar-
get's traffic data records alone. If one obtains traffic data related to all
of that central individual's contacts and perhaps even of their con-
tacts, however, it may be possible to separate these three groups. Fam-
ily members may all contact one another, but only the central individ-
ual contacts both family members and members of the terrorist
organization, and so forth. Of course, the analysis may not always be
cut and dried—different groups may have overlapping member-
ships—but the point remains that the more connection data ob-
tained, the more accurate a link analysis is likely to be in separating
out the various groups to which the target individual belongs.
For this reason, obtaining the traffic records of an individual who
has been linked to a suspected criminal or terrorist has an ambiguous
effect on that individual. The records may serve either to exonerate
that individual or to tie him or her more closely to the focus of the
analysis. Moreover, the use of one individual's traffic data in conjunc-
tion with a link analysis focused on another is unlikely to reveal the
broad sweep of that second individual's associations. Thus, the bur-
den on the freedom of association of such secondary individuals is
significantly less than would be imposed by a wide-reaching inquiry
into that individual's associations.
On the other hand, because a link analysis will tend to be im-
proved in its accuracy by including more and more data about these
higher order associations, a standard of mere "relevance," such as ap-
plies to most traffic data today, could be interpreted so as to permit
intrusions into the associations of a very large number of innocent
individuals with only tenuous connections to the target individual. 344
This is particularly true because the structure of social networks is
usually quite densely connected, perhaps even with a "small world"
344 See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2703, 2709 (West 2000 & Supp. 2007); 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861 (West
2000 & Supp. 2007).
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property. 345 This means that going just a few links out from any par-
ticular individual is likely to sweep in a large number of others. Inno-
cent expressive associations of such related individuals will unavoid-
ably be exposed by the link analysis. The more attenuated the links to
the target individual become, the less likely it becomes that traffic
data about these tenuously connected individuals will be of sufficient
use in sorting out the associations of the target person to justify the
burden on association of those individuals.
Obtaining the traffic data records of those who are not targets
should therefore be regulated according to a balance between rele-
vance to the link analysis and the degree of imposition on associa-
tional rights. A standard of reasonable suspicion that the second indi-
vidual is a member, along with the target of the link analysis, of a
criminal or terrorist enterprise might be•appropriate. Given the prob-
able cause standard for initiating the link analysis (and in the absence
of supplemental information to the contrary) this standard is likely to
be met for many of those with some degree of first order connection
to the target individual. On the other hand, imposing even a reason-
able suspicion threshold to obtain the traffic data of those with first-
order relations to the target individual might seriously hamper the
network analysis, and might even make it harder to exonerate those
with innocent connections to the target individual. As an alternative,
it might be reasonable to permit government officials to obtain traffic
records for anyone directly connected to the target individual and
then impose a reasonable suspicion threshold for those with more
remote connections, where information developed from the analysis
of first and second-order links could be used as part of the grounds
for reasonable suspicion. Any such threshold is less and less likely to
be met (unless further information is developed based on the earlier
analysis) with respect to those more tenuously linked to the target in-
dividual, but the records of these individuals are also decreasingly
likely to be important for the network analysis.
c. Pattern-Based Network Analysis
May the government constitutionally employ a broad-based net-
work pattern analysis technique to identify suspicious groups? Assume
for present purposes that a compelling government interest, such as
prevention of terrorism, motivates the surveillance. The constitutional-
345 See BARABASI, supra note 7, at 41-54 (discussing the "small world" problem); WATts,
supra note 7, at 37-42 (same).
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ity of the program this depends on the extent to which the pattern
analysis is tailored to that interest in light of the extent to which it is
likely to burden protected expressive associations. 346 Answering this
question depends critically on the accuracy of the pattern analysis algo-
rithm and its ability to discriminate between associations relevant to the
compelling government interest and other associations. The ability of a
network analysis algorithm to identify a particular type of organization
depends first on having either sufficient examples of traffic data associ-
ated with the particular type of association at issue—a terrorist organi-
zation, for example, or an association of pedophiles—or a sufficiently
accurate model of the communication patterns of such organizations
to generate a pattern that can be "matched' against available traffic
data. Second, the pattern must be sufficiently unique and well specified
that it will not "match" large numbers of other types of associations—
book groups, political organizations, and so forth.
Underlying any such pattern matching analysis is an assumption
that there is a sufficiently unique pattern to be found. If, for example,
book groups and terrorist organizations (or, perhaps, radical political
organizations and terrorist organizations) have similar traffic data pat-
terns, no network analysis algorithm will ever distinguish them using
that data. Any attempt will be overinclusive. If, on the other hand, vari-
ous terrorist organizations have significantly different traffic data pat-
terns, an attempt to identify them by such patterns will be underinclu-
sive. Social network analysis is still in its infancy. It is highly unlikely at
this point that a pattern-based analysis of traffic data could be suffi-
ciently well tailored to identify a particular type of illegitimate organiza-
tion as distinguished from numerous legitimate organizations. This is
particularly true with respect to organizations, such as terrorist net-
works, which are, thankfully, sufficiently rare as not to have been stud-
ied in detail in any statistically relevant numbers. The potential over-
breadth of such a pattern-based analysis of associations, its likely
inaccuracy, and its Orwellian potential to chill legitimate association
makes it extremely unlikely that First Amendment standards could be
met.347
s46 See Shelton, 364 U.S. at 988.
347 This analysis suggests why the Fourth Amendment alone is insufficient to protect the
freedom of association interests implicated by pattern-based analysis. An empirical survey of
perceived intrusiveness ranked data mining of phone, credit card, and travel records as less
intrusive on average than a pat-down search and slightly more intrusive than an "ID check
and questioning during a brief stop,' suggesting to the author of the study that a reasonable
suspicion standard would be appropriate for this kind of "event-driven data mining." Slobo-
. 2008]	 Relational Surveillance & the First Amendment 	 811
That being said, it may be possible in theory to develop pattern-
based relational analysis techniques, perhaps in combination with
mining of transactional data,348 which would be sufficiently accurate
to meet the First Amendment standard. Therefore, rather than cate-
gorically rule out the possibility of pattern-matching network analysis
(which is unlikely to happen in any event as long as there is some
hope that it can expose terrorist organizations before they strike),
such programs must be subject to judicial and congressional scrutiny.
Pattern-based relational surveillance is unlike many other surveillance
techniques in that its effectiveness is much less likely to be signifi-
cantly reduced by disclosure—even if the specific algorithms are dis-
closed. Unlike an individual "profile," which might be manipulated
once it is publicized, a network analysis deals with patterns of com-
munications among a group of individuals. If such a pattern is truly
characteristic of a particular type of illegitimate association as distinct
from other, legitimate organizations, it is likely to be very difficult for
that organization to manipulate. Patterns of communication arise be-
cause they are useful—perhaps even essential—to a group's activities.
If exposing that the government is looking for a particular "terrorist"
communication pattern forces malevolent organizations to adopt
other, presumably less effective and riskier, communication patterns
in order to "blend in or deters such groups from acting at all, that, in
itself, could be the greatest success of a pattern-based analysis scheme.
Because pattern-based network analysis cannot meet First
Amendment standards at present (and may be inherently unable to do
so), there is no legitimate need for government acquisition of large and
indiscriminate databases of communications records, such as the al-
leged acquisition by the NSA under the Bush administration of AT&T's
call record database. 3"
gin, Government Data Mining, supra note 6, at 18, 21 tbl. The average viewpoint about the in-
trusiveness of a particular type of "dativeillance" may be relevant for assessing "reasonable
expectations of privacy," but it is assuredly not the touchstone for First Amendment analysis,
which seeks to protect unpopular, out of the mainstream expression.
349 Such an approach may or may not be feasible in practice, even if all data were
available. Some researchers argue that loose social networks, such as terrorist networks in
an emergent rather than top-down fashion might be complex systems, which are inher-
ently unpredictable in detail (except during the very last stages of implementing a specific
plan of action). See Aaron B. Frank & Desmond Saunders-Newton, fournty from Analysis to
Inquiry: Technology and Transformation of Counter-Terrorism Analysis, in EMERGENT INFORMA-
TION TECHNOLOG IES, supra note 6, at 315, 320-24; Mark Lazaroff & David Snowden, Antici-
patory Models for Counter-Terrorism, in EMERGENT INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 6,
at 51, 69-71.
349 See Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 978 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
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3. Freedom of Association and Access to Communications Traffic
Data Outside of the Context of Network Analysis
As discussed above, freedom of association demands a stricter
standard for acquisition and use of traffic data for network analysis than
is reflected in the current statutory regime. 55° But what of government
acquisition of traffic data for use in more traditional investigations? A
list of an individual's first order communications traffic data certainly
has some potential to burden expressive association even though the
list may not be equivalent to a broad disclosure of association member-
ships. Moreover, in some cases the burden may be quite great (consider
the case, discussed by Solove, where the phone data pertains to the of-
fice phone of an unpopular expressive association, for example, or the
case where the traffic data discloses repeated contacts by an individual
with an unpopular expressive association). 55 ' The First Amendment
balance suggests that where there is an evident potential to burden ex-
pressive association, a probable cause warrant should be required. In
other cases, at a minimum, a court order should be required to obtain
traffic data so that a neutral judge can assess the potential First
Amendment burdens. In determining whether to grant an application
for such an order, courts should be directed to consider the potential
burden on protected association and not Simply whether the investiga-
tion is "conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the
first amendment to the Constitudon."352 That standard, currently en-
shrined in FISA, is utterly insufficient under the First Amendment. 353
Applicants for such orders should be required to articulate specific
facts based upon which the court can assess the First Amendment is-
sues.
D. Enforcing Freedom of Association Rights in a Networked Society
Even if we are convinced that government surveillance of traffic
data implicates freedom of association rights under the First Amend-
ment, there remains the question of how to enforce such rights as a
practical matter. Here we come up against several difficulties. First,
because network analysis does not in most cases begin by targeting
expressive or intimate associations, the proof of First Amendment
555 See supra notes 208-275 and accompanying text.
351 See Solove, supra note 9, at 169.
532 Sec 18 U.S.C.A. § 2709 (West 2000 & Supp. 2007); 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1842, 1861 (West
2003 & Stipp. 2007).
353 See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1842, 1861.
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harm in these contexts will nearly always depend on an overbreadth
argument, such as that made in Shelton.354 Chilling effects are difficult
to prove directly except in egregious cases. Second, the surveillance
context, along with the national security implications of network
analysis, mean that it will be difficult even to determine what law en-
forcement agencies are doing with respect to network surveillance, as
is illustrated by the cases involving the NSA programs, which de-
pended on a whistleblower and media investigations for the basic fac-
tual allegations.355 Third, network analysis is technically complicated
and, particularly for pattern-based analysis, assessing its accuracy re-
quires technical information about the algorithms and models em-
ployed, which governments will resist disclosing for both good and
nefarious reasons. Finally, as discussed above, there are hurdles to es-
tablishing standing in a lawsuit based on freedom of association, at
least under the federal associational guarantee. 356 These difficulties
are exacerbated in a surveillance situation where it is hard to know
what kinds of analysis the government is employing and who is being
targeted. Despite the difficulties, the importance of free association to
democratic life demands that we seek ways to regulate relational sur-
veillance adequately. This Section considers how that might be done.
1. Civil Lawsuits Challenging Relational Surveillance
The main hurdles to effective civil lawsuits challenging unconstitu-
tional relational surveillance are learning about unconstitutional activi-
ties and establishing standing to sue. Both targeted link analysis and
pattern-based network analysis are sufficiently overbroad in their in-
quiry into protected associations that a person whose associations were
investigated or uncovered would have a good claim to standing under
Shelton.357 The First Amendment's overbreadth doctrine and the avail-
ability of facial challenges to government actions make a lawsuit based
on freedom of association rights arguably easier to mount than a
Fourth Amendment challenge 558 Setting aside whether present-day
courts would extend Shelton to the network analysis context, however,
the larger difficulty may be simply finding out what the government is
doing with traffic data as long as current minimal statutory thresholds
354 See 364 U.S. at 488.
355 See Ellen Nakashima, A Story of Surveillance, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 2007, al Dl.
356 See Laird, 408 U.S. at 10.
"7 See 364 U.S. at 498.
39 See id.; Britt, 574 P.2d at 777.
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for obtaining it remain in effect. The public likely will have to rely on
whistleblowers and media investigations to obtain basic information
about what is being done. Where the relational surveillance to be chal-
lenged involves counterterrorism efforts—as it often would—the diffi-
culties of mounting and maintaining a lawsuit in the face of govern-
ment assertions of state secrets and national security interests are great,
as is evident from the course of the recent lawsuits involving the NSA
surveillance programs. 359 Civil lawsuits must play an important role in
regulating relational surveillance, but more is necessary.
2. The Criminal Context
As Solove pointed out in his article about the general implications
of the First Amendment for criminal procedure, one possible mecha-
nism for enforcement of constitutional rights in the surveillance con-
text is an exclusionary rule. 36° The basis for applying an exclusionary
rule to evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment would
seem to apply equally well to evidence obtained in violation of the First
Amendment's freedom of association protections. 361 Solove suggests
that there may be limited power in an exclusionary remedy in the gen-
eral First Amendment context, because criminal prosecutions are
unlikely to occur hi many situations in which government information
gathering implicates the First Amendment and, even where there are
criminal prosecutions, the defendant may not be the one to suffer the
First Amendment harm. 562 Although there is some truth to this in the
context of relational surveillance as well, there is at least one arena in
which an exclusionary rule based on freedom of association might have
some teeth—prosecutions under the material support statute. 363
The material support statute criminalizes the knowing provision
of "material support or resources," meaning
any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including cur-
rency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial
services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safe-
houses, false documentation or identification, communica-
356 See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
36° Solove, supra note 9, at 163-64.
361 See id.
362 Id.
369 Sec 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2339A-233913 (West 2000 & Supp. 2007). Thanks to Peter Swire
for pointing out the connection between relational surveillance and the material support
statute.
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dons equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explo-
sives, personnel (1 or more individuals who may be or include
oneself) and transportation, except medicine or religious ma-
terials. 364
The statute further defines "training," as meaning "instruction or teach-
ing designed to impart a specific skill, as opposed to general knowl-
edge;" and "expert advice or assistance," as meaning "advice or assis-
tance derived from scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge"
to those intending to engage in terrorist acts or to certain "designated
terrorist organizations."365 It is notable that the definition of "material
support" includes "personnel," which can include the defendant himself
or herself if he or she "has knowingly provided, attempted to provide, or
conspired to provide a foreign terrorist organization with 1 or more in-
dividuals (who may be or include himself) to work under that terrorist
organization's direction or control or to organize, manage, supervise, or
otherwise direct the operation of that organization." 66
The material support provision has been controversial in light of
its breadth and potential vagueness367 and some prosecutions under its
aegis have been criticized as overreaching. 368 Whatever one thinks of
the material support statute itself, it is a context in which the question
of the constitutionality of relational surveillance is highly likely to arise
because it is at heart a statute that regulates relationships, There are
likely to be significant evidentiary issues relating to proof both of the
acts required to prove the offense and of the mens rea. If evidence in
support of material support prosecutions is obtained using relational
surveillance of communications traffic data, there likely will be oppor-
tunities to argue that evidence be excluded.
Relying on a freedom of association doctrine developed in the
context of an exclusionary rule, however, has disadvantages. First,
though the material support statute provides one "hook" into govern-
ment programs of relational surveillance (and other criminal prosecu-
dons for related crimes of conspiracy and so forth may provide others),
384 Id.
sr's Id. § 2339A(b) (2)—(3).
366 Id. § 2339A(b) (1); id. § 23398(h).
367 Sec supra note 11 and accompanying text.
368 See, e.g., Leslie Eaton, U.S. Prosecution of Muslim Group Ends in Mistrial, N.Y. TimEs,
Oct. 23, 2007, at Al; Adam Liptak & Leslie Eaton, Financing Mistrial Adds to U.S. Missteps in
Terror Prosecutions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2007, at A16; Neil MacFarquhar, Muslim Groups Op-
pose a List of "Co-Conspirators," N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 2007, at A19; Neil MacFarquhar, U.S,,
Stymied 21 Years, Drops Bid to Deport 2 Palestinians, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2007, at A18.
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not all important issues of relational surveillance will arise in a criminal
context.369
 Second, experience with the Fourth Amendment should
make one wary about defining rights within the context of an exclu-
sionary rule. The desire to convict the guilty exerts a pressure toward
narrow interpretation of the corresponding constitutional rights.
3. The Possibility of Legislative Protection for Freedom of Association
Although legislation is not necessary to mandate protection for
freedom of association—the Constitution does that—Congress also
bears a responsibility to enforce the Bill of Rights and it has been par-
ticularly likely to act in the arena of surveillance regulation. 3" Legisla-
tion is particularly helpful in the surveillance context because of the
difficulty in detecting constitutional violations ex post and the need
for clear direction to law enforcement officials. Legislation can also
be used to draw a slightly wider boundary around constitutional rights
so as to cabin executive branch discretion. 371 It also provides a clear
target for challenges in court when necessary. Given the difficulties in
regulating relational surveillance via lawsuits and evidentiary exclu-
sion, Congress should act to protect freedom of association.
There are two ways to regulate relational surveillance by statute.
Congress can regulate the circumstances under which law enforce-
ment agents can obtain communications traffic data and under which
telecommunications providers can share such data with government
agents. Congress can also regulate the uses to which communications
data can be put. As a first cut at this issue, it seems reasonable to pro-
pose regulations of both types.
a. Regulation of Sharing of Communications Traffic Data with Law
Enforcement
As discussed in Part III, real time government acquisition of com-
munications traffic data is currently regulated by "pen register" statutes
tinder the Wiretap Act572 and FISA,373 which permit law enforcement
369
 Solove, supra note 9, at 164.
37U
	 US Corrs -r. amend I; see, e.g., Kerr, Constitutional Myths, supra note 6, at 858 (ar-
guing that Congress is best suited to regulate surveillance using new technologies); Swire,
Katz Is Dead, supra note 6, at 905 (arguing that courts have an important role to play in
regulating surveillance using new technologies).
371 The "super-warrant" provisions of the wiretap act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516-2518 (West 2000
& Supp. 2007), and the pen register provision, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127 (2000 & Supp, IV
2004), play this role, for example.
372 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127.
373 50 U.S.C.A. § 1842 (West 2003 & Supp. 2007).
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officials to obtain a requisite court order by certifying that the informa-
tion is "relevant" to "an ongoing criminal investigation" or "an ongoing
investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine
intelligence activities." 374 The FISA provision prohibits the use of a pen
register to conduct an investigation of a U. S. person "solely upon the
basis of activities protected by the first amendment." 375 Stored elec-
tronic communications records may be obtained pursuant to a court
order if the records are "relevant and material to an ongoing criminal
investigation" or by a NSL if they are "relevant to an authorized investi-
gation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelli-
gence activities," again provided that the investigation is not conducted
solely on the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment. 376
The analysis presented in this Article demonstrates that these hur-
dles are not sufficient to regulate the use of traffic data for relational
surveillance. Given the importance of associational interests involved,
at a minimum acquisition of communications traffic data should re-
quire a court order, The question remains as to what standard should
be applied. It would be possible to impose different standards depend-
ing upon whether law enforcement officials intend to apply a network
analysis to determine associations. A more workable approach, how-
ever, might be to use a reasonable suspicion-type standard 377 to permit
the government to intercept communications traffic data or obtain it
from stored records only where the information was not only relevant
to an ongoing criminal or foreign intelligence investigation, but where
there were specific and articulable facts providing reason to believe that
the traffic data pertains to an individual guilty of a criminal offense of
sufficient seriousness or pertains to a suspected agent of a foreign
power.
374 18 U.S.C. § 3122; 50 U.S.C. § 1842.
"5 50 U.S.C. § 1842 (a) (1).
376 18 U.S.C.A. § 2709 (West 2000 & Supp. 2007); 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861 (West 2003 & Supp.
2007).
377 The standard I propose here is similar to that adopted by a recent legislative proposal
aimed at regulating NSLs. National Security Letter Reform Act of 2007, S. 2088, 110th Cong.
(2007). Though I suggest borrowing some of the language from that legislation, the pro-
posed legislation addresses a somewhat different issue. See id. It does not cover obtaining
communications traffic data. See id. Indeed, the legislation would not permit the use of NSLs
to obtain communications traffic data, but only subscriber records. See id. Moreover, the legis-
lation deals with NSLs, whereas my proposal would require a court order. See id. Note that
recent revelations about NSL abuse by the FBI have revived Congressional interest in pursu-
ing NSL reform. Alexei Alexis, Leahy Says Legislation ?fay Be Needed to Address FBI Data Collec-
tion Problems, Prhmcy L. Watch (BNA) (Mar. 19, 2008).
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In addition to a general provision governing the acquisition of
communication traffic data, there should be a specific provision regu-
lating targeted link analysis. A probable cause warrant should be re-
quired to instigate a targeted link analysis if it requires the acquisition
of communications traffic data beyond that accessible under the gen-
eral rule already discussed (assuming that the analysis requires the use
of traffic data records of individuals who are not reasonably suspected
of criminal or terrorist activity). Once such a warrant has been ob-
tained, not only the communications traffic data of the target individ-
ual, but also the communications traffic data of individuals for whom
there are specific and articulable facts providing reason to believe that
they have been in contact with or otherwise directly linked to the tar-
get, should be automatically accessible. Obtaining the records of indi-
viduals indirectly linked to the target, however, would require an ap-
plication under the general rule.
Besides these two specific means of obtaining communications
traffic data, it might be appropriate to have a third, "catch-all" category
in which the First Amendment standard is directly applied by the court
considering whether to grant the order. 378 Because a court order would
be required (unlike in the NSL situation), the court would be in a posi-
tion to assess the First Amendment ramifications of any specific circum-
stances not covered by the two primary provisions.379 The catch-all pro-
vision would permit an order to issue where the court determines that
the records pertain to a specific criminal or national security investiga-
tion and that obtaining them is a sufficiently narrowly tailored means of
pursuing a compelling government interest in light of the potential
burdens on expressive and intimate association. It would be wise for
Congress to oversee use of such a catchall provision by requiring law
enforcement officials to report on their use of it.
b. Regulation of Pattern-Based Network Analysis
Besides regulating the acquisition of communications traffic data
on a case-by-case basis, Congress should specifically regulate the use of
pattern-based network analysis. Congress should begin by banning the
use of such analysis to identify criminal or terrorist groups at least
178 This proposal is inspired by a similar provision in the proposed NSL legislation. S.
2088, § 2 (allowing a NSL to issue if obtaining the records is the least instrusive means"
that pertains to activities of a suspected agent of a foreign power).
379 This is similar to what courts do in assessing subpoenas for association membership
information in the context of civil litigation. See supra notes 261-275 and accompanying
text.
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unless and until the accuracy of the algorithms is proven. Congress
should also clarify that the standard methods for obtaining communi-
cations traffic data may not be used to amass large databases of traffic
data for purposes of pattern-based analysis. Congress might wish to
authorize research into the possibility of pattern-based analysis and to
mandate a report on its technical feasibility and privacy and associa-
tional implications. Only if and when congressional investigation
demonstrates that pattern-based network analysis is sufficiently accu-
rate to be both useful and protective of civil liberties should any such
program be authorized. In this case, usefulness and civil liberties pro-
tection are felicitously aligned. Although there are legitimate objec-
tions to mere government access to large databases of communica-
tions records, the level of harm to freedom of association is closely
tied to the extent to which any such algorithm accurately reports only
illegitimate activity. The usefulness of any such algorithm similarly
depends on its accuracy. Skepticism about whether pattern-based
analysis is inherently capable of such distinctions is well warranted. At
the least, Congress should require proof of accuracy. If when such
a program is ever authorized, some oversight mechanism must be put
into place to vet the specific algorithms to be used and to audit the
results.
CONCLUSION
To summarize, the right to freedom of association under the First
Amendment limits government use and acquisition of communications
traffic data based on the extent to which the government data use
amounts to a disclosure of expressive associations. These limitations are
in addition to, and independent of, any limitations arguably deriving
from the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, unlike Fourth Amendment
protections, which are at least weakened, if not entirely vitiated, by any
disclosure to third parties, First Amendment freedom of association
rights do not depend on secrecy. Information about association mem-
bership in the hands of third parties is still subject to First Amendment
protection. Particularly in light of the increasing availability of traffic
data and of techniques for analyzing such data to ascertain information
about associational structures, current statutory standards are insuffi-
cient to meet the requirements of the First Amendment. The First
Amendment analysis implicates not only government access to infor-
mation, but also the technology used to analyze available information.
Broad programs of pattern-based analysis of traffic data, such as
may be intended by the alleged NSA acquisition of the call databases
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of telephone service providers such as AT&T, are almost certain at this
point to be insufficiently aligned with compelling government inter-
ests to withstand First Amendment scrutiny because they are likely to
expose a large number of legitimate expressive associations (and to
fail to identify illegitimate associations). Any programs of pattern-
based analysis should be authorized . only by specific legislation that
provides for hearings into the technical feasibility and accuracy of the
proposed approach.
Because of its likelihood to uncover a significant proportion of
the target individual's expressive associations, targeted link analysis of
a particular individual's associations can comport with First Amend-
ment requirements only when uncovering those associations is closely
related to a compelling government interest. A warrant supported by
probable cause would be an appropriate prerequisite to such an in-
quiry. Once such a warrant has been obtained for a link analysis of a
target individual's associations, a lesser standard may be appropriate
for obtaining traffic data pertaining to other individuals that is neces-
sary to the analysis. This standard should weigh the lesser imposition
on the expressive association of such "secondary" individuals against
the decreasing potential that the data is pertinent to the focal link
analysis the more tenuous the connection to the target individual.
The First Amendment sufficiency of current statutory standards
for government obtaining of traffic data is questionable even where
there is to be no network analysis. A more stringent standard than
mere relevance, which takes into account the right to freedom of as-
sociation, is needed in some cases, such as those involving the traffic
data of an expressive association itself. At a minimum, a court should
review requests for traffic data and explicitly consider the potential
First Amendment implications raised. When the target of the data
gathering is an expressive association, for example, a request for traf-
fic data should meet the probable cause standard discussed above.
When the target is an individual and there is no intention to perform
link analysis, a materiality standard is the minimum safeguard to en-
sure that the request is sufficiently related to the government interests
at stake. An applicant for such an order should be required to set out
facts relevant to the associational issue so that a court can assess
whether First Amendment standards are met.
This Article certainly does not pretend to be the last word about
how to incorporate freedom of association protections into relational
surveillance practices. The freedom of association implications of pat-
tern analysis, in particular, depend on the extent to which the accumu-
lation of the necessary data and the specific algorithmic implementa-
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tion are prone to inaccuracy and abuse. How accurately does a particu-
lar algorithm distinguish malevolent from protected associative groups?
How well does the system protect against abuse by rogue elements or by
government itself? Does the system adequately protect against "mission
creep" away from truly compelling government interests? Assuming
that the system uses some form of anonymizing algorithm, how well
does that algorithm protect the anonymity of legitimate associations?
How does one balance the possibly greater accuracy obtained by fold-
ing more data (including, perhaps, transactional data regarding credit
card purchases and so forth) into the analysis with the greater potential
chilling effect of a more intrusive government probe into expressive
association? Until specific procedures are exposed to scrutiny by the
courts under the appropriate First Amendment standard aimed at pro-
tecting both mainstream and unpopular expressive activities, these
questions cannot be answered with certainty.
We are at an important crossroads for the future of free associa-
tion. Law enforcement officials charged with preventing terrorism un-
derstandably seek to exploit relational analysis for that purpose, leading
to pressure to expand the availability of traffic data to government.
There are calls for requiring that increasing amounts of traffic data be
retained by ISPs and others. It is critical that these calls for increased
relational surveillance be balanced by careful analysis both of what is
really possible with these new computational technologieS and what is
at stake for democratic society in light of the increasing importance of
technologically mediated emergent association.
